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As they passed through the streets, all the people shouted, 
“See the emperor’s new clothes.  Never has he had such a 
fine suit.  How rich the cloth; how bright the jewels!” 
“But,” said a little child, “he has nothing on!”1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
College and university athletic programs across America enjoy the 
astonishing pecuniary fruits of a legal myth—that the sports in those 
programs are amateur.  Indeed, while many college sports may genuinely be 
amateur,2 others—most especially football and men’s basketball at major 
NCAA institutions—plainly are not.  As we will demonstrate in this 
Article, and as few thoughtful observers doubt, these college sports are 
fantastically commercial and decidedly not amateur. 
Nevertheless, the myth of amateurism is stubborn, and for a powerful 
reason.  It supports the significant economic and legal interests of 
important institutions in America.  An enormous cast of participants 
harvests a wealth of riches from major college sports.  Universities derive 
enormous revenues and other indirect, but vital, benefits from successful 
athletic programs.3  Corporations that sponsor athletic contests gain 
valuable exposure for their products and services.4  The NCAA supports 
itself entirely by revenues generated from selling broadcasting rights of 
its members’ games.5  Many coaches are compensated lavishly for producing 
successful programs.6  Media enterprises generate rich advertising revenues 
by airing college athletic events.7  Indeed, college sports constitute a $60 
 
 1. Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in THE MAGIC REALM 
OF FAIRY TALES 62, 68 (W. Publ’g Co. 1968). 
 2. Among the sports that are, in fact, amateur are the non-revenue-generating 
sports.  Swimming, track and field, baseball, softball, gymnastics, and wrestling are 
examples. 
 3. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the 
Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 75 (2006). 
 4. See id. at 75–76. 
 5. Id. at 76. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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billion industry.8  Given the collective power of those whose interests this 
myth advances, it is little wonder it persists.  One role of the law, however, 
is to distinguish myth from reality and thereby to eschew a “tyranny of 
labels.”9  The idea that major college sports are amateur is demonstrably 
false, and that fallacy has improperly sheltered college sports from the 
application of a variety of laws. 
We identify here three areas of law—specifically labor, antitrust, and 
taxation—in which the myth of amateurism has served to shield university 
athletic programs and the NCAA from regulation.  These areas are 
hardly exclusive,10 but they provide eloquent witness to the fact that the 
myth of amateurism provides unwarranted and improper exemption from 
the law at the expense of the athletes, the public, and justice itself.11 
The purpose of this Article is to lift the veil of amateurism from the 
face of the college sports industry and to document its deeply commercial 
character.  Because the college sports industry is thoroughly commercial 
and not, as the NCAA contends, an amateur enterprise, NCAA Division 
I college athletic programs should be subject to laws that apply to other 
commercial activities. 
The consequences of the proper legal characterization of major college 
sports would be many.  For example, properly considered as employees, 
the players would be entitled under labor law to wages as well as to a 
range of statutory protections accorded all U.S. employees.12  The NCAA 
 
 8. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Dollars, Dunks and Diplomas (PBS television 
broadcast July 9, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/july-
dec01/ncaa_07-09.html. 
 9. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Posner, J.). 
 10. See infra note 16. 
 11. Perhaps the most pernicious effect of the perpetuation of the myth of 
amateurism is the grossly disproportionate burden it places on African-American athletes 
in major college athletic programs.  Put plainly, NCAA universities reap vast fortunes 
from their football and men’s basketball programs, predominantly manned by African-
Americans, while simultaneously limiting the compensation these athletes may receive 
to the cost of an education.  In so doing, they foster a modern system of apartheid where 
the majority exploits racial minorities.  We examine this issue more fully in a forthcoming 
article. 
 12. See infra Part I.A.  These protections would include not only compensation for 
work-related injuries, see infra note 16, but also the right to be free from discrimination 
on the basis of race and other protected classifications, see Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-15 (2006), the right to have limited the number of 
hours worked, see Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006), and, as 
described in this Article, the right to join a union, to engage in concerted activity, and to 
bargain collectively. 
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rule limiting the level of athlete compensation to the cost of tuition, 
books, room, and board at the athlete’s institution13 would be rightly 
viewed as a form of price fixing, punishable under the antitrust laws.14  
And lastly, colleges would no longer reap enormous athletic revenues on a 
tax-free basis, but instead would compete evenly with others in the 
entertainment industry by paying taxes, thereby also bearing their proper 
share of the costs of society.15 
Part I of this Article will identify three areas of law—labor, antitrust, 
and tax—in which regulation depends upon the characterization of an 
activity as commercial rather than amateur.  Part II will document the 
thoroughly commercial nature of major college athletics, thereby lifting 
the veil of amateurism in which the NCAA seeks to enshroud itself.  The 
Article concludes that because major college sports enterprises are not 
amateur, they should be subject to the application and scrutiny of the 
laws we examine here, and, no doubt, to others as well. 
II.  LABOR, ANTITRUST, AND TAX LAWS ALL APPLY DIFFERENTLY IN 
COMMERCIAL, AS DISTINCT FROM AMATEUR, SETTINGS 
In various areas of the law, vastly different rules apply to commercial, 
as distinct from amateur, enterprises, with commercial enterprises bearing 
greater regulation than do amateur activities.  We focus on three such 
areas of law which observe this dichotomy and are especially relevant to 
major college sports: labor, antitrust, and tax.16 
 
 13. See NCAA, 2007–08 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL arts. 15.1, 15.2.1–15.2.4 
(2007), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_i_manual/2007-
08/2007-08_d1_manual.pdf [hereinafter DIV. I MANUAL]. 
 14. See infra Part I.B. 
 15. See infra Part I.C. 
 16. Although we focus on only three areas of law, distinctions between the 
regulation of commercial, as distinct from amateur, activities may be found in other 
areas of law as well.  For example, nonprofit organizations are subject to a less vigorous 
regulatory enforcement regime than are for-profit enterprises.  See generally Lumen N. 
Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose Is Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style 
Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1984–92 (2007) (discussing board of director, 
third-party, and government oversight of nonprofit corporations).  Workers’ compensation 
cases also differentiate between commercial and noncommercial activities, declining to 
extend the statutes to university athletes because of their amateur status, among other 
reasons.  While early workers’ compensation decisions held that athletes were covered 
by such laws, that view has since been uniformly rejected.  Compare Univ. of Denver v. 
Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 425–30 (Colo. 1953) (allowing application of workers’ 
compensation claims for football-related injuries and death), and Van Horn v. Indus. 
Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172–73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (same), 
superseded by statute, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(k) (West 2005) (excluding from the 
definition of employee “[a]ny student participating as an athlete in amateur sporting 
events”), with Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173–75 (Ind. 
1983) (holding that college athletes are not employees under state workers’ compensation 
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A.  Labor Law 
University athletes are not currently extended the rights and 
protections of labor and employment laws because, in major part, case 
law differentiates between amateur and commercial enterprises.  In its 
2004 Brown University decision, the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) examined whether graduate student assistants were employees 
with organizing rights under the National Labor Relations Act.17  Like 
NCAA Division I athletes, those graduate assistants were enrolled as 
students, received scholarships, and provided valuable services for their 
university.18  In that case, the NLRB acknowledged the traditional common 
law “right of control” test for employee status,19 but required an additional 
showing if the putative employee was also a student.20  Under that 
circumstance, the Board held that the question of their employee status 
also depended upon whether the student-university relationship was 
primarily academic or commercial and held they were not employees 
because they were “primarily students [with] a primarily educational, not 
economic, relationship with their university.”21  Put differently, the 
NLRB concluded “that the overall relationship between the graduate 
student assistants and Brown [was] primarily an educational one, rather 
than an economic one.”22 
Under this analysis, then, whether NCAA Division I athletes, especially 
football and men’s basketball players, are within the protection of labor 
law depends upon whether their relationships with their universities are 
 
laws because they are students and not employees, and therefore are not entitled to 
workers’ compensation for athletics-related injuries), and Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 
336 N.W.2d 224, 226–28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (same). 
It is noteworthy in this regard that the NCAA reacted to the earlier workers’ 
compensation cases by coining the very term “student-athlete” and incorporating it in 
their rules and communications in an effort to emphasize the educational, and to 
deemphasize the commercial, functions of athletes.  See WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES 
HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 69–76 (1995); 
MURRAY SPERBER, ONWARD TO VICTORY 445–57 (1998); Murray Sperber, In Praise of 
‘Student-Athletes’: The NCAA Is Haunted by Its Past, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 
1999, at A76. 
 17. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004). 
 18. Id. at 484–85. 
 19. See id. at 483 & n.3 (returning to prior precedent that included the common 
law test); see also id. at 491 (declining to abandon the common law test by indicating 
that common law concepts could be considered in part). 
 20. See id. at 483, 487. 
 21. Id. at 487. 
 22. Id. at 489. 
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primarily academic or, as we argue here, principally commercial.23  
Because the athlete-university relationship is primarily commercial, not 
academic,24 the athletes should be considered employees under Brown 
University, not amateurs or “student-athletes” as the NCAA incessantly 
asserts.  The overwhelmingly commercial nature of major college athletics 
means that labor law must apply to those college athletics. 
B.  Antitrust Law 
The myth of amateurism is likewise at the heart of the NCAA’s 
insulation from the antitrust laws, and any antitrust challenge to NCAA 
rules governing players will encounter the Association’s amateurism 
defense.  This defense has been variously formulated, but essentially 
provides that the NCAA produces a singular product, one that is by its 
nature amateur, and that the NCAA must be accorded broad latitude to 
administer and regulate college sports for the preservation of that 
product.25 
The United States Supreme Court embraced this reasoning in NCAA v. 
Board of Regents,26 when it wrote, “the preservation of the student-
athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate 
 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. That the athlete’s relationship to his university is not primarily academic has 
been demonstrated elsewhere.  See, e.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 
135–55 (describing NCAA-sanctioned special admissions policies, eligibility for freshmen 
athletes, grueling and time-consuming practice and playing schedules, sham curricula, 
substandard academic performances, institutional academic fraud, insufficient NCAA 
academic progress requirements, and NCAA-sanctioned low graduation rates for athletes, all 
of which promote NCAA member institutions’ commercial interests, not athletes’ academic 
interests). 
 25. See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to 
Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 213–18 (1990); Chad W. Pekron, The Professional 
Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation 
Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 28 (2000); Kenneth L. Shropshire, The Erosion of 
the NCAA Amateurism Model, ANTITRUST, Spring 2000, at 46, 49; Note, Sherman Act 
Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1299–1301 
(1992). 
 26. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (scrutinizing NCAA plan 
limiting live broadcasting of college football games).  In that case, the University of 
Oklahoma challenged the NCAA’s television plan as violating Sherman Act prohibitions 
against price fixing and output restrictions.  See id. at 88.  The plan “limit[ed] the total 
amount of televised intercollegiate football and the number of games that any one team 
[could] televise.  No member [of the NCAA was] permitted to make any sale of 
television rights except in accordance with the basic plan.”  Id. at 94.  Using a rule of 
reason analysis, the Court held that “by curtailing output and blunting the ability of 
member institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather 
than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life[,]” in violation of 
the antitrust laws.  See id. at 117, 120. 
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athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.”27  
There, the Court distinguished between the NCAA’s commercial business 
activities, like the television marketing plan under examination, and its 
so-called noncommercial activities, which the Court characterized as 
necessary to protect amateurism and to preserve the college football 
product, rendering those noncommercial activities outside the reach of 
the Sherman Act.28  The Court wrote, “[i]t is reasonable to assume that 
most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of 
fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore 
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate 
athletics.”29  Indeed, a primary reason NCAA rules forbidding athlete 
compensation beyond a certain level—an act of naked price fixing 
among commercial competitors—have not been condemned “is the 
belief that the restrictions somehow preserve an amateur tradition.”30 
The foundation for the NCAA’s immunity from antitrust law rests 
upon the false premise that its activities promote and preserve an amateur, 
noncommercial product.  If the NCAA’s activities were viewed as 
commercial, they would not merit exemption through the amateurism 
defense to the antitrust laws. 
C.  Tax Law 
Commercial enterprises are subject to income tax.31  For example, 
professional sports leagues, like the National Football League, National 
Basketball Association, and National Hockey League, pay income taxes 
 
 27. Id. at 120. 
 28. See id. at 117 (“The specific restraints on football telecasts that are challenged 
in this case do not . . . fit into the same mold as do rules defining the conditions of the 
contest . . . .”); Pekron, supra note 25, at 38. 
 29. Pekron, supra note 25, at 38 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117). 
 30. Id. at 28; see also McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 
1988) (upholding NCAA restraints on athlete compensation as reasonable because “[t]he 
NCAA markets college football as a product distinct from professional football.  The 
eligibility rules [regarding compensation] create the product and allow [for] its survival 
in the face of commercializing pressures.  The goal of the NCAA is to integrate athletics 
with academics.  Its requirements reasonably further this goal”); Pekron, supra note 25, 
at 37 (“No antitrust lawsuit directly challenging any NCAA restrictions on athletes has 
ever succeeded.  Courts have deferred to the NCAA’s claim that it needs to impose 
anticompetitive restrictions on college athletes in order for college sports to exist at 
all.”). 
 31. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 11, 501(c) (2006) (imposing income tax on corporations but 
not including commercial entities among list of those exempt from income tax). 
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because they are considered commercial enterprises dedicated to the 
production of profit.32  By contrast, other organizations, including many 
which are purportedly amateur in nature like the NCAA and its member 
universities, pay no income taxes provided they meet the federal income 
tax requirements for tax-exempt status33 and are not subject to the 
Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT).34 
To enjoy tax-exempt status, an entity must be “organized and operated 
exclusively for” a tax-exempt purpose, such as education.35  It must also 
ensure that “no part of [its] net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual. . . .”36  Even if an entity has achieved 
tax-exempt status, it will nevertheless be subject to income tax under 
UBIT to the extent its net income results from the regular conduct of a 
trade or business which is not substantially related to its exempt 
purpose.37  Therefore, to avoid income taxation completely, an entity 
must be both tax exempt and fall outside the application of UBIT. 
To gain tax-exempt status, an entity must be operated exclusively for a 
tax-exempt purpose.  So, for example, an educational organization’s 
activities must further an educational purpose.38  In addition, its revenues 
 
 32. See Letter from Bill Thomas, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
to Myles Brand, Executive Director, NCAA  2 ¶ 2 (Oct. 2, 2006) (on file with author) 
(describing fact that tax exemption for college sports is a difference between college and 
professional sports enterprises). 
 33. See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (2000). 
 34. See I.R.C. §§ 501(b), 511–514 (2000). 
 35. I.R.C § 501(c)(3) (2000) (setting forth the organizational and operational tests 
for tax-exempt status as well as listing exempt purposes, such as education). 
 36. Id.  Additionally, the entity may neither engage to a substantial degree in 
“carrying on propaganda . . . to influence legislation,” nor “participate . . . [n]or intervene 
in . . . any political campaign . . . [for or against a] candidate for public office.”  Id. 
 37. §§ 501(b), 511–513; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)–1(a)(1) (as amended in 1982).  
Congress enacted the UBIT in 1950, see Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81–814, §§ 
301, 331, 64 Stat. 906, 947, 957 (1950), in response to concerns that some tax-exempt 
entities engaging in commercial activities were using their exempt status to shelter 
profits and were thereby competing unfairly against commercial entities subject to tax.  
In support of the UBIT, President Truman stated in 1950: “[A]n exemption intended to 
protect educational activities has been misused in a few instances to gain competitive 
advantage over private enterprise through the conduct of business and industrial 
operations entirely unrelated to educational activities.”  James L. Musselman, Recent Federal 
Income Tax Issues Regarding Professional and Amateur Sports, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 195, 204 n.64 (2003).  He was referring to the New York University School of 
Law’s ownership of the macaroni company, C.F. Mueller Co.  NYU received the 
macaroni profits on a tax-exempt basis because of its exempt status as an educational 
organization, allowing it an unfair advantage over for-profit pasta manufacturers.  See 
C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’g, 14 T.C. 922 
(1950).  The purpose of the UBIT, therefore, “was to eliminate a source of unfair 
competition by placing the unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations 
upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which they 
compete[d].”  Treas. Reg. § 1.513–1(b) (as amended in 1975). 
 38. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(i)(f), 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(3). 
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must be used for education, the public or an exempt purpose, not for the 
private financial benefit of individuals.39  If the organization’s activities 
substantially further a non-exempt purpose, then tax-exempt status is lost 
even if the organization also seeks to fulfill important exempt purposes.40 
To avoid taxation under UBIT, a tax-exempt educational organization 
that regularly operates a trade or business must ensure that the trade or 
business substantially furthers and contributes importantly to education 
other than through producing income to fund educational activities.41  
That is, the mere production of income by the trade or business to 
finance other educational activities does not satisfy this test if the 
activities of the trade or business are not themselves directly and 
substantially educational.42  Income exceeding the reasonable needs of 
the educational purpose is considered unrelated business income and is 
taxed.43  The larger the profits from an exempt organization’s trade or 
business, the more likely the activity will be deemed unrelated to the 
exempt purpose and, therefore, subject to tax.44 
These elements together demonstrate that whether an entity is free 
from or subject to income taxation depends upon how much it furthers 
tax-exempt or public objectives, like education, as opposed to commercial 
objectives, like revenue enhancement and private financial benefit.  In short, 
commercial activities are subject to income taxation while amateur activities 
that promote a public purpose like education are generally tax exempt. 
The NCAA has long been treated as a tax-exempt educational 
organization.45  Universities are also tax exempt as educational organizations, 
and even their revenues related to major college sports have been exempted 
 
 39. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii). 
 40. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1); see also Church by Mail, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 765 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 41. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.513–1(a), 1.513–1(d)(1)–(2); Indep. Ins. Agents of Huntsville, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 42. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.513–1(a), 1.513–1(d)(1)–(2); Indep. Ins. Agents of Huntsville, 
Inc., 998 F.2d at 901. 
 43. Treas. Reg. § 1.513–1(d)(3). 
 44. Treas. Reg. § 1.513–1(d)(3)–(4); Musselman, supra note 37, at 206. 
 45. See 2006 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT 52, available at http://www.ncaa.org/ 
library/membership/membership_report/2006/2006_ncaa_membership_report.pdf 
[hereinafter 2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT] (noting NCAA’s tax-exempt status under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3)); Erin Guruli, Commerciality of Collegiate Sports: Should the IRS Intercept?, 12 
SPORTS LAW. J. 43, 58 (2005). 
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from UBIT.46  The vastly increased commercial nature of college athletics, 
however, requires that the earnings associated with it be taxed.47 
The NCAA’s tax-exempt status should be re-examined.  NCAA football 
and men’s basketball do not promote education.  On the contrary, NCAA 
academic rules are designed to promote commercial, not academic, values.48  
The proliferation of corporate sponsorships and television revenues has 
introduced powerful commercial, profit-based incentives into NCAA and 
university athletics decisions.49  Excessive and ever-escalating salaries for 
coaches, conference commissioners, and NCAA executives indisputably 
constitute the use of athletic revenues for private financial benefit, not 
for an educational, public purpose.50 
Because universities do otherwise serve important educational purposes, 
we do not argue here that they should lose their tax-exempt status, but 
only that their revenues from football and men’s basketball should be 
taxed under the UBIT.  Division I-A football and men’s basketball are 
major businesses in which universities regularly engage.  Those businesses 
do not substantially further or contribute importantly to education, and 
should therefore be deemed unrelated businesses subject to taxation.  
Revenues generated in these two sports are phenomenally high and 
substantially exceed reasonable needs for promoting education.51  Aware 
of the ever-increasing commercialization of major college sports, Congress 
has recently questioned whether they should remain sheltered from the 
income tax.52 
As with labor law and antitrust, the tax exemption enjoyed by major 
college sports is founded upon the false premise that they serve the 
public purpose of education when, as we will next document, some of 
those sports are fantastically commercial and bear not at all upon the 
university’s educational mission.  In this way, the spectacle of major 
college sports, so dazzling and entertaining, parades before us clad in the 
emperor’s new clothes, a veil of amateurism.  In reality, however, Division I 
 
 46. See H.R. REP. NO. 81–2319, at 37 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 409; 
S. REP. NO. 81– 2375, at 29 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3082 and in 
1950-2 C.B. 483, 505 (cursorily concluding that “[a]thletic activities of schools are 
substantially related to their educational functions”); Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195; 
Musselman, supra note 37, at 207–08. 
 47. See Guruli, supra note 45, at 58; Richard L. Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics 
and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430, 1455–60 (1980); 
Frank G. Splitt, The U.S. Congress: New Hope for Constructive Engagement with the 
NCAA and Intercollegiate Athletics, THE MONT. PROFESSOR, Spring 2007, at 18, 18–25, 
available at http://mtprof.msun.edu/Spr2007/splitt.html. 
 48. See supra note 24. 
 49. See infra Parts II.A–E, G. 
 50. See infra Part II.F. 
 51. See infra Part II. 
 52. See Thomas, supra note 32. 
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NCAA revenue-generating athletics programs of football and men’s 
basketball are not amateur, but highly commercial.  Big-time college 
sports do not further the educational mission of universities, but instead, 
are highly lucrative businesses.  They generate enormous sums of money 
for the NCAA, for conferences, for Bowl Championship Series participants, 
for universities, and for each of these organizations’ various leaders and 
officials, including head coaches.  The relationship between athletes and 
their universities is permeated with commercial concerns and too often lacks 
educational content.  As commercial enterprises, Division I college athletics 
should be subject to the various laws that apply to other commercial 
entities and should not find shelter in the false claim that they are amateur.  
For these reasons, athletes should be considered employees of their respective 
universities, antitrust laws should apply to prevent wage fixing among 
universities for the labor of athletes, and revenues generated from the 
NCAA Division I sports of football and men’s basketball should be 
subject to federal income tax. 
III.  COLLEGE SPORTS ARE FAR FROM AMATEUR—THEY FORM A 
THOROUGHLY COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE 
Let’s recognize that most of it is professional anyway.  
Coaches are paid millions of dollars a year, like professional 
coaches.  It’s marketed very much like a professional entertainment 
activity.  The only thing that’s missing is the payment for the 
players.53 
The NCAA’s founding purpose was to rein in violence, injury, and 
death in college football.54  Its primary focus on player safety, however, 
 
 53. 60 Minutes: Where’s Ours? (CBS television broadcast Jan. 6, 2002), transcript 
at 16 (quoting James Duderstadt, former President of the University of Michigan and 
former college football player).  “We in Division I are in an entertainment business, and 
we can’t fool ourselves.”  RICK TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE: THE CORRUPTION 
OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO STOP IT 191 (1989), reprinted in Rick 
Telander, Something Must Be Done, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 2, 1989, at 92, 105 
[hereinafter Telander, Something Must Be Done] (quoting former University of Minnesota 
president Kenneth Keller’s speech to a special NCAA convention in 1987). 
 54. See generally HOWARD J. SAVAGE, AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 13–29 
(1929) (discussing how violence in college athletics during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries led to the NCAA’s formation).  In 1905, college football experienced eighteen 
deaths and 149 serious injuries.  Frank W. Carsonie, Comment, Educational Values: A 
Necessity for Reform of Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 661, 667 
(1991).  That year the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States was 
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has changed significantly since its inception.  The NCAA now serves as 
a powerfully profitable economic engine,55 commercial clearinghouse, 
and advocate for its members’ financial interests.56  It “has essentially 
become an economic regulator and promoter of college athletics, in 
addition to its stated function of supervising the integrity of its member 
institutions.”57  Many NCAA rules, including those shaping academic 
requirements and the grant-in-aid, are structured to further universities’ 
commercial interests by enabling them to field talented teams rather than 
by promoting the players’ academic concerns and are bald evidence of 
the commercial nature of Division I college sports.58  Plainly, the 
relationship between universities and many athletes is primarily an economic 
one, not an academic one. 
In spite of its obviously commercial nature, however, the NCAA 
“clings to the ideal of the ‘amateur’ student-athlete”59 to avoid paying 
 
formed, becoming the NCAA in 1910.  Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An 
Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 656 n.5 (1978). 
 55. See infra Part II.A. 
 56. For example, the NCAA administers the rules its members enact and negotiates 
contracts.  In this manner, the NCAA “act[s] as a cartel for bargaining purposes with 
entities like TV networks . . . .”  Telander, Something Must Be Done, supra note 53, at 110; 
see also Tanyon T. Lynch, Quid Pro Quo: Restoring Educational Primacy to College 
Basketball, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 595, 612 (2002) (“[P]romotion and economic 
regulation . . . are the NCAA’s dominant functions.”); Stefan Fatsis, Money Drives 
March Madness, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 16, 2004, at C1 (interviewing Terry Holland, 
former University of Virginia basketball coach and athletic director who characterizes 
the system as emphasizing only two things: “winning games and making money”). 
 57. Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-
Athlete for Participation in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 SPORTS LAW. J. 25, 31 n.28 
(1996); see also John C. Weistart, Legal Accountability and the NCAA, 10 J.C. & U.L. 
167, 175 (1983) (discussing the NCAA’s role as an economic regulator and promoter); 
Christopher L. Chin, Comment, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA’s Unlawful Restraint of 
the Student-Athlete, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1217 (1993) (same). 
 58. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 135–55 (demonstrating how 
NCAA academic requirements are often structured to advance the commercial interests 
of the university membership more than academic concerns of athletes); id. at 108–17 
(demonstrating how NCAA rules regarding the grant-in-aid are structured more to 
further the members’ commercial interests than the athletes’ academic needs).  If an 
athlete’s relationship with his university were truly academic, and not commercial, then 
should his studies and athletic obligations conflict, he could withdraw from the team.  
First, however, Division I athletes rarely quit their sports to devote their energies towards 
their educations, and second, even if this were to occur, there would be economic 
consequences for the athlete’s elevation of academics over athletics—he would 
immediately lose his grant-in-aid.  Both facts undermine athletes’ identities as students.  
See Lynch, supra note 56, at 608–09 (arguing that the compensatory function of the 
grant-in-aid undermines athletes’ roles as students, subverting “educational primacy,” 
and that the commercial nature of college sports prevents an athlete’s status as a student 
from taking precedence over his role as an athlete). 
 59. Chin, supra note 57, at 1214. 
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wages to college players.60  By limiting athletes’ compensation to the 
cost of attending a university rather than to a competitive market wage, 
the NCAA has enabled its member institutions to limit their labor costs 
significantly.  And while the NCAA and its members reap billions of dollars 
in revenues, the average “student-athlete” earns less than the federal 
minimum wage.61  In fact, many such athletes live below the poverty line.62 
The NCAA’s Division I Manual is peppered with references to 
amateurism.  Its first stated purpose is “to promote and develop . . . athletics 
participation as a recreational pursuit,”63 while another is “[t]o encourage 
its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory standards 
of . . . amateurism.”64  As elaborated in its first fundamental policy, “[a] 
 
 60. As described above, see supra Part I, the NCAA derives two significant 
financial benefits from promoting the façade of amateurism—it minimizes its labor costs 
by avoiding the obligation to pay its athletes a competitive wage, see supra Parts I.A–B, 
and it strengthens its tax-exempt status, see supra Part I.C, for the college sports 
entertainment industry.  See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS 4–5 (1999); 
Brian L. Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title IX as Catalyst for an Alternative Model 
of College Sports, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 351, 413 n.353 (1998) (discussing tax 
exemption of college sport revenues generally); Brian L. Porto, The Legal Challenges to 
“Big-Time” College Sports: Are They Threats or Opportunities for Reform?, VT. B.J., 
June 2001, at 41, 41; D. Stanley Eitzen, Slaves of Big-Time College Sports, USA TODAY, 
Sept. 1, 2000, (Magazine), at 26; 2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 45, at 52 
(noting NCAA’s tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). 
 61. “When the value of their scholarships are computed on an hourly basis, the 
result is that the average student athlete does not even make minimum wage.”  Orion 
Riggs, Note, The Facade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major-College Athletics, 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 1996, at 137, 143 (citing DICK DEVENZIO, RIP-OFF U. 
160 (1986)); see also Bryan Jurewicz, Opinions: Pay-for-Play, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 6, 
1997 (on file with author) (computing value received at the University of Wisconsin at 
$1.35 per hour for 20 hours a week of mandatory workouts); UCLA Football Players 
Hope to Spur NCAA Reforms, SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 18, 2001 (on file with author).  In 
the early 1980s it was estimated that through their athletic scholarships, student-athletes 
made as little as sixty cents an hour.  See Riggs, supra, at 143 (citing DEVENZIO, supra, 
at 160). 
 62. See Collegiate Athletes Coalition, Living Below the Poverty Line . . .,  
http://www.studentgroups.ucla.edu/cac/povertyline.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2008); 60 
Minutes, supra note 53, at 15 (quoting Ramogi Huma, former UCLA linebacker).  Some 
athletes have so few resources they sometimes lack money for food.  See UCLA Football 
Players Hope to Spur NCAA Reforms, supra note 61 (describing players who must 
“scrimp on food” and “pay attention to those cheeseburger deal days at McDonald’s” 
because of financial constraints); id. at 16 (describing case of Donnie Edwards, former 
UCLA football player who was suspended by the NCAA after accepting groceries from 
an anonymous donor); id. (describing NCAA admission “that a scholarship falls $2,000 a 
year short of what it really costs to get by”). 
 63. DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 1.2(a) (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. art. 1.2(c). 
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basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics 
as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an 
integral part of the student body65 and, by so doing, retain a clear line of 
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”66  
In limiting athletes’ permissible compensation to financial aid covering 
the cost of attendance, the Manual prohibits “[a]ny other financial 
assistance,”67 reinforcing the notion that the athletes are amateurs.  The 
NCAA’s general principle of amateurism states “[o]nly an amateur 
student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a 
particular sport,”68 and finally, in case the notion was not already clear, 
the Manual asserts “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate 
sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education 
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.  Student 
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-
athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and 
commercial enterprises.”69  This professed ideology of amateurism evokes 
Shakespeare’s incisive admonition, “The lady doth protest too much, 
methinks.”70 
The reality of major college sports could hardly be more different 
from the dreamy, wish-filled, innocent ideals the NCAA claims to espouse.  
While college athletes are held in servitude by NCAA amateurism 
requirements,71 college sports have become a fabulously profitable commercial 
enterprise and an important component of the sports entertainment 
industry.  Billions of dollars are generated annually in this industry.72  
Simultaneously, the NCAA desperately and continuously attempts to 
transform its athletes into mere students, mere amateurs, through the 
repetition of its “student-athlete” label.73  It does so because amateurism 
 
 65. See JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE 78–79 
(2001) for a discussion of the consequences of college sports participation, and that 
college athletes are often isolated within their groups and are not an integral part of the 
student body as the NCAA suggests. 
 66. DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 1.3.1. 
 67. Id. art. 2.13. 
 68. Id. art. 12.01.1. 
 69. Id. art. 2.9. 
 70. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2 (G.R. Hibbard ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1987) (n.d.). 
 71. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, arts. 15.1, 15.2.1–15.2.4. 
 72. See Tom Farrey, Play-for-Pay: Not Yet, but Soon?, ESPN.COM, Mar. 28, 2001, 
http://espn.go.com/ncb/ncaatourney01/s/2001/0326/1162258.html (describing how “the 
money flowing through college basketball makes the sport look less like an amateur 
event each year”). 
 73. See supra note 16 (describing NCAA’s motive for creating the “student-
athlete” term). 
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is the myth74 that richly serves its financial interests and those of its 
member institutions.75  The actions of all involved in college sports and 
the pecuniary results to the contrary, however, speak decibels louder.  
Indeed, as we will now detail,76 every party in the industry, other than 
the athletes themselves—those most immediately responsible for the 
product77—enjoys bounteous financial benefit from the college sports 
enterprise.78 
A.  The NCAA 
The NCAA generates enormous revenue each year from college 
sports,79 as a brief review of its annual report reveals.  It most recently 
 
 74. See Lynch, supra note 56, at 612 (describing NCAA’s declarations of support 
for educational primacy to be at odds with its real objective); Chin, supra note 57, at 
1235; Riggs, supra note 61. 
 75. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 76. The remainder of this Article will demonstrate in detail the financial benefit 
various actors procure from the enterprise of college sports.  Although these numbers can 
be numbing in their magnitude and breadth, they are necessary to our case that the 
enterprise of Division I-A football and men’s basketball is commercial, not amateur. 
The commercialism of college athletics can be demonstrated in other ways which are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  For example, athletic departments operate as separate 
units in universities, distinct from the academic parts of the institution, and with separate 
administrative structures.  They also use employment rules not common in universities.  
For example, university athletic departments do not make coaches eligible for tenure.  
See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 125 n.233.  Another employment rule 
commonly found outside, but not within, the academy is the noncompete agreement.  
NCAA rules prevent the free movement of players to compete at other universities in an 
arrangement analogous to these agreements.  See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, arts. 
14.2, 14.2.1, 14.2.1.1, 14.5.1 (eliminating one year of a player’s four years of eligibility 
for transferring to another university). 
 77. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 76 & n.24 (describing 
numerous examples of and ways in which universities have packaged players as 
entertainment products); Chin, supra note 57, at 1214 (observing the athlete is the main 
producer of revenue). 
 78. A great many individuals are employed in the major college sports industry.  
For example, the 2004 football program at Michigan State University employed some 
seventy people within its football coaching staff, support staff, strength and conditioning 
staff, medical staff, and athletic equipment staff.  This figure does not include forty-one 
additional administrators and staff employed in the MSU Athletic Department or twenty-
one other head coaches and an unspecified number of non-football assistant coaches and 
staff.  MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, SPARTAN SPORTSZONE MAG. 16, 38, 40, 82, 136 
(Oct. 9, 2004). 
 79. “It’s a very, very rich corporation now that’s bringing in billions upon billions 
of dollars.  And what we’re saying is, ‘Lookit, let’s do something to improve the lot of 
the athletes that are generating this for us.’” 60 Minutes, supra note 53, at 20 (quoting 
Leo Gerard, President, United Steelworkers of America regarding the NCAA). 
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reported revenues for 2005–2006 of almost $558.2 million.80  Over four-
fifths of that revenue, almost $471 million,81 came from selling rights to 
televise games, primarily the men’s annual NCAA basketball tournament.82  
The other significant source of NCAA revenue in 2005–2006, championships 
and NIT tournaments, generated more than $57.2 million.83 
Most NCAA revenues are apportioned among Division I member 
conferences and universities, and in 2005–2006, Division I universities 
received NCAA distributions totaling more than $307.6 million.84  NCAA 
expenses are also substantial.  Costs associated with running NCAA 
championship tournaments exceeded $74 million.85  In that same year, 
the NCAA used $96.4 million for expenditures benefiting the entire 
association86 and incurred management and general operational expenses 
of over $26.5 million.87  In the end, however, the NCAA was highly 
profitable, having earned $31.4 million of revenues in excess of total 
expenses.88 
The NCAA anticipates even greater income in coming years.89  Overall 
NCAA revenues are projected to be over $560.5 million in 2006–2007, 
more than $602 million in 2007–2008, and over $647 million in 2008–
2009.90  This projected income will derive largely from television revenues, 
 
 80. 2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 45, at 18. 
 81. Id.; see also Welch Suggs, Big Money in College Sports Flows to the Few, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 29, 2004, at A46, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/ 
v51/i10/10a04601.htm (describing how most NCAA revenue from 2003–2004 was also 
generated by selling the right to broadcast the men’s annual basketball tournament). 
 82. Most NCAA revenue is generated from the men’s basketball tournament.  See 
BYERS, supra note 16, at 261; Riggs, supra note 61, at 138.  For more detailed information 
about how revenues from the NCAA’s men’s basketball tournament are distributed to 
colleges and universities, see infra Part II.D.  The 2005–2006 television and marketing 
rights revenues of $471 million include royalty revenues.  2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra 
note 45, at 18 (describing how royalties, now designated “marketing rights fees,” were 
included in “television revenue” in and after 2002–2003, but were reported separately as 
royalties before that).  Royalties are derived from the NCAA’s active marketing of 
thousands of products bearing its name and logo as well as its licensing of athlete 
likenesses to video game companies.  See Kristine Mueller, No Control Over Their 
Rights of Publicity: College Athletes Left Sitting the Bench, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 70, 81–83 (2004); Schott, supra note 57, at 31. 
 83. 2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 45, at 18. 
 84. Id. at 19. 
 85. Id. at 19, 22.  This amount includes championship costs for all three NCAA 
divisions.  See id. at 19. 
 86. Id. at 19. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 18–19.  The NCAA normally enjoys a multimillion-dollar surplus each 
year.  See BYERS, supra note 16, at 370. 
 89. See 2004 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT 44, available at http://www.ncaa.org/ 
library/membership/membership_report/2004/2004_ncaa_membership_report.pdf [hereinafter 
2004 MEMBERSHIP REPORT]. 
 90. Id. 
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ranging from $503.8 million in 2006–2007 to $783.1 million in 2012–
2013.91 
Beginning with the 2003 men’s basketball tournament, the NCAA 
began enjoying the fruits of its fantastically lucrative broadcasting-rights 
contract with CBS television.92  Under that agreement, CBS pays the 
NCAA 6 billion dollars over eleven years for the right to broadcast 
March Madness, the NCAA men’s basketball tournament.93  Amounting, 
on average, to 545 million dollars each year, these funds will for the 
most part be distributed to the NCAA’s member institutions, further 
enriching their coffers.94  The NCAA will profit handsomely as well.95 
B.  Conferences 
The conferences into which the universities group themselves, originally 
representing regional ties and historic rivalries, also profit greatly from 
college sports.  Like the NCAA, conferences also sell the right to broadcast 
their members’ football and basketball games.96 
In doing so, they make a great deal of money.  The Atlantic Coast 
Conference (ACC), for example, generated $148.9 million in 2005–
2006, with most of that income arising from football television contracts 
($35.8 million), basketball television contracts ($33.3 million), football 
bowl games ($25.6 million), and NCAA basketball tournament distributions 
($13.1 million).97  Other revenue came from the ACC basketball tournament 
($7.6 million), from the ACC football championship ($5.7 million), and 
from other football and basketball revenue ($7.3 million and $2.9 million, 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Tim Martin, Cash Up for Grabs, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 9, 2003, at A1. 
 93. Id.; see also Suggs, supra note 81; Welch Suggs, CBS to Pay $6-Billion for TV 
Rights to NCAA Basketball Championships, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 3, 1999, at A54 
[hereinafter Suggs, TV Rights]; Farrey, supra note 72; 60 Minutes, supra note 53, at 14. 
 94. See BYERS, supra note 16, at 79 (asserting most of the television revenues the 
NCAA negotiates are eventually distributed to member institutions).  The $545 million 
average per-year cost to broadcast March Madness is more than networks pay annually 
to televise NASCAR ($400 million) and more than CBS pays each year to televise NFL 
games ($512.5 million).  See Suggs, TV Rights, supra note 93. 
 95. BYERS, supra note 16, at 90 (stating the NCAA generally receives a percentage 
of the television rights contracts it negotiates). 
 96. See Riggs, supra note 61, at 138.  A few universities, like Notre Dame, have remained 
independent, opting not to join a conference, but, instead, to reserve for themselves the 
economic value of their television rights.  See id. 
 97. Atlantic Coast Conference, IRS Form 990, EIN 56-0599082, FYE June 30, 
2006 (on file with author). 
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respectively).98  XM Satellite Radio fees for the year amounted to $1.6 
million.99 
That same year, the ACC distributed $130.2 million to its twelve 
member universities, ranging from a low of $8.45 million to Virginia 
Tech University to a high of $12.47 million to Florida State University.100  
The average payment per university was over $10.8 million.101 
The Southeastern Conference (SEC) also generated significant revenue, 
earning $138.7 million in 2005–2006.102  Most of this income was derived 
from the televising of and other earnings from regular season football 
games ($51.2 million), post-season bowl games ($23.0 million), post-
season basketball games ($27.0 million), and regular season basketball 
games ($13.1 million).103 
Conferences also often hold lucrative post-season basketball tournaments.  
Through its first five years, for example, the Big Ten basketball tournament 
netted $21.9 million from the sale of broadcasting rights and tickets as 
well as from corporate sponsorships.104  These profits, in turn, increase 
the distributions to member universities. 
Conferences with at least twelve members, like the SEC, are permitted 
under NCAA rules to hold a conference championship in football as 
well.105  Such additional games bring in still more revenue for conferences 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id.  Other significant conference expenses included the cost of running 
athletic events, nearly $6.9 million, staff salaries and benefits, $3.4 million, conferences, 
conventions, and meeting costs, nearly $735,000, media and external relations costs, 
almost $500,000, conference basketball tournament expenses, over $1.8 million, football 
championship expenses, over $1.2 million, and conference bowl expenses, over $561,000.  Id. 
 102. Southeastern Conference, IRS Form 990, EIN 63-0377461, FYE Aug. 31, 
2006 (on file with author). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Joe Rexrode, Success Story: Big Ten Event Has Made Money, Helped 
Teams Get Prepared for NCAA Tourney, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at C1(on file 
with author). 
 105. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 17.11.5.2(c).  This rule has given 
conferences a powerful financial incentive to add members to meet the dozen-team 
requirement.  See BYERS, supra note 16, at 349–50; ZIMBALIST, supra note 60, ch. 5; 
Riggs, supra note 61, at 138.  In the summer of 2003, the ACC raided the Big East 
Conference, acquiring Virginia Tech and the University of Miami, thereby increasing its 
membership to eleven universities.  See Joe Drape, Wall Street Now Runs Through 
Campus, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at D1; Bill Finley, Dollars Are Driving A.C.C. 
Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2003, at D1; Atlantic Coast Conference, The ACC.com, 
About the ACC, http://www.theacc.com/this-is/acc-this-is.html (last visited Mar. 2, 
2008); Lynch, supra note 56, at 611 n.108 (describing addition of Florida State 
University to the ACC and of Pennsylvania State University to the Big Ten Conference).  
In 2006, Boston College also joined the ACC, bringing membership to twelve and 
enabling the conference, for the first time, to hold a profitable conference football 
championship.  Sports Briefs, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 13, 2003, at 2D. 
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and their members.  In the case of the SEC, revenue from conference 
football championships was an additional $15.9 million in 2005–2006.106  
The SEC earned another $1.9 million from sponsorship royalties that 
year.107 
In the same year, the SEC distributed more than $122 million to its 
twelve member universities, ranging from a low of $9.8 million to 
Mississippi State University to a high of $10.7 million to Louisiana State 
University.108  The average payout per conference member was $10.2 
million.  Other important conference expenses included the cost of running 
an SEC basketball tournament ($1.5 million), costs associated with running 
SEC football championships ($2.0 million), staff salaries and benefits 
aggregating $2.8 million, and travel, occupancy, conference, convention, 
and meeting costs totaling over $1 million.109 
Sizeable conference revenues, most of which are distributed to member 
universities, are not uncommon.  The Big Twelve Conference earned 
total revenues in 2005–2006 of more than $113.4 million, paying staff 
salaries and benefits of over $3.3 million and distributing more than 
$90.1 million to its twelve member universities.110  The Big Ten Conference 
earned almost $127 million in 2005–2006, had a total payroll of over 
$3.1 million, and distributed over $117.8 million to its eleven university 
members.111  Like the NCAA, the major conferences are themselves powerful 
commercial entities that earn and distribute hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually and together constitute an important economic actor in 
the college sports business. 
C.  Bowl Games 
Not surprisingly, successful athletic programs generate the most income, 
and the greatest revenue follows particularly successful seasons.112  
 
 106. Southeastern Conference, IRS Form 990, EIN 63-0377461, FYE Aug. 31, 2006 
(on file with author). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Big Twelve Conference, Inc., IRS Form 990, EIN 75-2604555, FYE June 30, 
2006 (on file with author). 
 111. The Big Ten Conference, Inc., IRS Form 990, EIN 36-3640583, FYE June 30, 
2006 (on file with author). 
 112. See ROBERT H. FRANK, CHALLENGING THE MYTH: A REVIEW OF THE LINKS 
AMONG COLLEGE ATHLETIC SUCCESS, STUDENT QUALITY, AND DONATIONS 3 (May, 
2004), http://www.knightcommission.org/images/uploads/KCIA_Frank_report_2004.pdf; 
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Conferences make money when their universities win or even attend bowl 
games or tournaments.113  At the end of the 2006–2007 college football 
season, all college bowl games generated more than $217.6 million in 
additional revenue for the conferences of participating universities.114 
Major NCAA Division I football programs with the most successful 
seasons may be eligible to compete in the Bowl Championship Series 
(BCS), comprised of the five most prestigious bowls: the Rose Bowl, 
Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, Allstate Sugar Bowl, FedEx Orange Bowl, and 
BCS National Championship Game,115 the site for which rotates among 
the locations of the four other BCS bowls.116  Historically, the University 
of Notre Dame and six member conferences, the Atlantic Coast Conference, 
the Big East, the Big Ten, the Big 12, the Pacific 10, and the SEC, made 
up the BCS.117  Recently, five other conferences joined the arrangement.118  
Currently, the two teams highest in the BCS standings play in the National 
 
Telander, Something Must Be Done, supra note 53, at 97; Martin, supra note 92; Dennis 
Dodd, Notebook: Price Tags for Top Coaches Reaching Stratosphere, CBS Sports 
Line.com, Jan. 25, 2005, http://www.sportsline.com/collegefootball/story/8133032/1. 
 113. See 60 Minutes, supra note 53, at 14. 
 114. NCAA, 2006–2007 POSTSEASON FOOTBALL ANALYSIS OF EXCESS BOWL 
REVENUE AND EXPENSE BY CONFERENCE (Apr. 11, 2007), http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/ 
postseason_football/2006-07/Excess_Bowl_Rev-Exp.pdf; NCAA, FINANCIAL REVIEW OF 
2006–2007 POSTSEASON BOWLS 5-YEAR SUMMARY OF INSTITUTIONAL EXPENSES (Apr. 
11, 2007), http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/postseason_football/2006-07/5_yr_summary _inst 
_exp.pdf [hereinafter NCAA, POSTSEASON BOWLS, INSTITUTIONAL EXPENSES].  Total 
gross receipts from all revenue sources for the 2006–2007 football postseason were 
$313,877,694, but $96,276,977 was retained by sponsoring agencies, leaving a total of 
$217,600,717 for distribution to conferences and participating teams.  NCAA, FINANCIAL 
REVIEW OF 2006–2007 POSTSEASON BOWLS 5-YEAR SUMMARY OF GROSS RECEIPTS, 
http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/postseason_football/2006-07/5_yr_summary_GR.pdf 
(Apr. 11, 2007); NCAA, POSTSEASON BOWLS, INSTITUTIONAL EXPENSES, supra. 
Lower-tier bowls frequently distribute as little as $750,000 to the conferences of each 
participating team.  See Paul Pedersen, College Bowl Games Spread the Wealth, 
TREASURE COAST BUS. J., Jan. 15, 2005, at A1; Brent Schrotenboer, Bowls Gone Wild! 
Just 10 Years Ago, There Were 18 Bowl Games. This Season, There Are a Record 32. 
Have We Reached the Limit? Maybe Not, Because TV Networks, Sponsors and Schools 
Are Enjoying the Ride, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Dec. 17, 2006, at C1.  In January, 2007, 
the Toyota Gator Bowl paid $2.5 million to each participant.  Id.  The Outback Bowl 
paid $3 million per team, and the Capital One Bowl paid $4.25 million per team.  Id. 
 115. Fox Sports on MSN, Bowl Championship Series, BCS Bowl Facts, http://www. 
bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/facts (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) [hereinafter BCS, Bowl Facts]. 
 116. See Wendell Barnhouse, Double Dip, Revamped BCS: One Site Hosts Two 
Games, the Second for a Title, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 1, 2007, at D10. 
 117. See Fox Sports on MSN, Bowl Championship Series, Bowl Championship 
Series FAQ, available at http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/faq [hereinafter BCS, FAQ] 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2008).  These six conferences and Notre Dame were the participants 
in the BCS arrangement.  See id. 
 118. “In 2004, Conference USA, Sun Belt, Mid-American, Mountain West and 
Western Athletic conferences joined the BCS.”  Id. 
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Championship Game.119  Champions of the original six BCS-member 
conferences are guaranteed spots in BCS bowl games.120  The champions 
of the five more recent conferences to join the BCS automatically 
qualify to play in a BCS bowl game only if they rank high enough in the 
BCS Standings.121  Any slots remaining open among the five BCS bowl 
games are then allocated among at-large teams.122 
The BCS has estimated that its five bowl games generate more than 
$1.2 billion in annual economic impact in host cities.123  Of the total 
BCS revenue from the 2006–2007 championship series, over $142.5 million 
was distributed to member conferences.124  Conferences of participating 
teams receive this revenue from two sources: payments from the bowl 
organizations themselves, such as the Sugar Bowl or Rose Bowl (largely 
funded with corporate sponsorships125 and ticket revenues); and payments 
from Fox Broadcasting Company and ABC Sports.126  Conferences then 
allocate this money between the conference itself and its member universities 
according to their own internal agreements.127  The BCS projects that 
 
 119. See Fox Sports on MSN, Bowl Championship Series, BCS Selection Policies 
and Procedures, http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/eligibility (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Fox Sports on MSN, Bowl Championship Series, The BCS is . . . , 
http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/definition [hereinafter BCS, Definition] (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2008). 
 124. NCAA, BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES FIVE YEAR SUMMARY OF REVENUE 
DISTRIBUTION 2002–2006, http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/postseason_football/2006-
07/5_yr_summary_rev_dist.pdf (on file with author).  At the culmination of the 2006–
2007 football season, each team participating in a BCS bowl game was projected to earn 
for its conference between $14 million and $17 million.  See BCS, Bowl Facts, supra 
note 115. 
 125. See infra Part II.G. 
 126. Fox has agreed to pay $320 million to televise the Fiesta, Orange, and Sugar 
Bowls for four years as well as the National Championship Game when hosted at those 
bowl sites.  See Barnhouse, supra note 116; Schrotenboer, supra note 114; Fox Sports on 
MSN, Bowl Championship Series, BCS Conferences, http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/ 
conferences (last visited Mar. 3, 2008); BCS, Definition, supra note 123; BCS, FAQ, 
supra note 117.  ABC is paying about $30 million annually through 2014 to retain the 
right to broadcast the Rose Bowl and the National Championship Game when played in 
Pasadena (2010 and 2014).  See Schrotenboer, supra note 114; BCS, Definition, supra 
note 123. 
 127. See Tim Martin, Big Ten’s Share of NCAA Pot May Dwindle, CENTRE TIMES 
DAILY, Mar. 16, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Martin, Big Ten’s Share]; Martin, supra note 
92. 
MCCORMICK.DOC 9/11/2008  10:33:23 AM 
 
516 
over the next decade, it will distribute $2.1 billion to conferences and 
universities.128 
That the BCS is a device created and operated primarily to generate 
financial gain is undeniable.  For example, the BCS organization emphasizes 
increases in TV viewership129 and devotes a full page of its website to 
bowl game Nielsen television ratings.130  Prominently featuring these ratings 
is, of course, a means by which the BCS advertises its product—the 
bowl games themselves—to prospective corporate sponsors and other 
advertisers.  The higher the ratings, the more valuable the bowl games 
are to prospective advertisers, the more advertisers will be willing to pay 
broadcasters, and the more a broadcaster will pay the BCS for broadcasting 
rights.  In addition, the higher the Nielsen ratings, the more revenue the 
BCS will generate directly from its own set of competing corporate 
sponsors. 
Ironically, and despite the NCAA’s claim that college athletics is an 
amateur enterprise, the January 2003 BCS national championship football 
game enjoyed significantly higher Nielsen ratings, and thus much greater 
commercial value, than the NFL playoff games aired in the same week.131  
The BCS website prominently displays this fact.  It also proudly announces 
the phenomenal 21.7 Nielsen rating for the 2006 National Championship 
Rose Bowl between Southern California and Texas, the highest rated 
BCS game ever.132 
The revenues earned from the five BCS bowl games are only part of 
the money generated in post-season play.  The twenty-seven non-BCS 
 
 128. Fox Sports on MSN, Bowl Championship Series, Bowl Background, http://www. 
bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/background (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) [hereinafter BCS, Bowl 
Background].  See generally ZIMBALIST, supra note 60, at chapter 5 for a discussion of 
the enormous financial impact of the Bowl Championship Series. 
 129. See BCS, Bowl Background, supra note 128; Fox Sports on MSN, Bowl 
Championship Series, TV Ratings, http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/tvratings (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2008) [hereinafter BCS, TV Ratings] (noting for 2005–2006 that television 
ratings for BCS bowl games increased an average of 29.6 percent, that the overall 
average rating for all college football bowl games increased by 15 percent, and that the 
ratings for 16 bowl games increased from the previous year). 
 130. See BCS, TV Ratings, supra note 129.  Ratings for BCS bowl games are also 
reported under BCS, Bowl Facts, supra note 115.  See also Football Bowl Association, 
2006–2007 Post-Season Bowl Results, http://www.footballbowlassociation.com/documents/2006-
07 BowlAttendance-Ratings.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 131. The January 2003 Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, that year’s national championship game, 
earned a Nielsen rating of 17.2.  BCS, TV Ratings, supra note 129.  That is, 17.2% of all 
U.S. households with television sets, or 18,168,000 households, watched that game.  Id.  
An average prime-time program on one of the broadcast networks, by contrast, rates 8.8, 
or 9,279,070 households.  Id.  Two professional football playoff games, aired the same 
week as the Fiesta Bowl, earned lower ratings.  The Atlanta-Green Bay game garnered a 
rating of only 16.0, and the New York Giants-San Francisco game earned a rating of 
only 13.5.  Id. 
 132. Id. 
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bowl games133 and various post-season conference championships134 also 
generate wealth for the conferences of the schools that participate.  For 
example, at the end of the 2006–2007 football season, non-BCS bowl games 
generated over $75 million for conferences of participating teams.135 
That the entire BCS enterprise is commercial is laid bare by the fact 
that four of the five BCS bowls have sold their very identities to corporations.  
The Orange Bowl is now the FedEx Orange Bowl.  The Sugar Bowl is 
now the Allstate Sugar Bowl.  The Fiesta Bowl has become the Tostitos 
Fiesta Bowl.136  As the BCS National Championship Bowl Game rotates 
among the four existing BCS bowl sites, it will carry the corporate name 
of the sponsoring host bowl.137  This corporate branding of these athletic 
events highlights the fundamentally commercial character of so-called amateur 
college athletics.  To say that major college football is a highly commercial, 
richly successful industry is a sublime understatement.  Moreover, the 
experience in football is replicated in the other revenue-generating sport, 
men’s basketball. 
 
 133. See Schrotenboer, supra note 114, at C1.  Among the non-BCS bowls are the 
Capital One Bowl, the Cotton Bowl, the Chick-fil-A Peach Bowl, and the Outback Bowl.  
See id. 
 134. Under NCAA rules, a conference with at least twelve member schools may 
hold a lucrative conference championship game.  See supra note 105 and accompanying 
text. 
 135. NCAA, 2006–2007 Postseason Football Non-BCS Revenue Distribution, 
http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/postseason_football/2006-07/Non-BCS_rev_dist.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 136. See BCS, Bowl Facts, supra note 115.  While the Rose Bowl has not renamed 
itself for a corporate sponsor, it has, in part, joined this commercial trend by allowing 
Citicorp to associate itself with this oldest of college bowls.  See id. (displaying the Rose 
Bowl logo as “Rose Bowl Game presented by Citi”).  Even the minor bowls have 
adopted this profitable practice of corporate sponsorship.  The following is a partial list 
of obvious examples: the GMAC Bowl, the MPC Computers Bowl, the MasterCard 
Alamo Bowl, the Continental Tire Bowl, the EV1.net Houston Bowl, the Pacific Life 
Holiday Bowl, the Gaylord Hotels Music City Bowl, the Vitalis Sun Bowl, the AutoZone 
Liberty Bowl, the SBC Cotton Bowl Classic, the Toyota Gator Bowl, the Capital One 
Bowl, and our favorite, the Chick-fil-A Peach Bowl.  See MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, 
supra note 78, at 64; infra Part II.G.  Other examples include: the Papa John’s Bowl, the 
Insight Bowl, the Meineke Bowl, the Outback Bowl, and the Capital One Bowl.  See 
Schrotenboer, supra note 114, at C10. 
 137. For example, in 2007 when the BCS National Championship Game was played 
in Glendale, Arizona, a week after the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, it was called the Tostitos 
BCS National Championship Game.  See Barnhouse, supra note 116, at D10; BOWL 
CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, 2007–2008 MEDIA GUIDE 10, 14, http://www.bcsfootball.org/id/ 
7212064_37_1.pdf. 
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D.  March Madness 
As noted above, a major portion of the NCAA’s annual revenues, 
usually at least three-quarters, is derived from its men’s basketball 
tournament, known affectionately by basketball fans as March Madness 
or the Big Dance.138  Additional tournament income is derived from corporate 
sponsors and ticket sales.139  For the most part and as in football, this 
revenue is then distributed to NCAA member conferences, colleges, and 
universities.140  Under the NCAA’s distribution formula, the better a 
conference’s members perform in the men’s basketball tournament, the 
more revenue is distributed to that conference to be shared among conference 
members according to the conference’s own internal arrangements.141 
Over $307.6 million in NCAA revenues from men’s basketball were 
distributed among member conferences in 2006.142  The bulk of this 
money was earned through the NCAA’s eleven-year, $6 billion contract 
to allow CBS to broadcast the annual men’s basketball tournament.143  
Of total distributions, approximately $147.4 million was divided among 
conferences based upon the number of sports their member schools 
sponsored and the number of scholarship athletes.144  Another $122.8 
million was divided among the conferences based upon the teams’ 
tournament performances.145  In 2006, each conference was paid approximately 
$164,000 for each game a conference member played in the preceding 
six tournaments other than the championship game.146  Thus, as a general 
 
 138. See supra Part II.A. 
 139. Total attendance at the 2006 men’s basketball tournament was 670,254.  
NCAA, OFFICIAL 2007 NCAA MEN’S BASKETBALL RECORDS BOOK 234, http://www.ncaa.org/ 
library/records/basketball/m_basketball_records_book/2007/2007_m_basketball_records
.pdf [hereinafter BASKETBALL RECORDS]; see also Martin, supra note 92 (noting 
attendance at tournament games has nearly tripled since 1979). 
 140. See supra Part II.A. 
 141. See Fatsis, supra note 56; Martin, Big Ten’s Share, supra note 127; Martin, 
supra note 92. 
 142. 2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 45, at 20. 
 143. See id. at 18; Suggs, supra note 81, at A46. 
 144. 2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 45, at 20 (sum of Total Sports 
Sponsorship Fund, Total Grants-in-Aid Fund, and Total Student-Athlete Opportunity 
Fund); Fatsis, supra note 56 (referring to same figures in 2004 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, 
supra note 89, at 24); Suggs, supra note 81, at A46; NCAA, 2006–2007 Revenue 
Distribution Plan, 4. Broad-Based Distribution & 6. Student-Athlete Opportunity Fund, 
http://www1.ncaa.org/finance/revenue_distribution_plan (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) 
(describing NCAA funds divided among member conferences). 
 145. See 2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 45, at 20; NCAA, 2006–2007 
Revenue Distribution Plan, 5. Basketball Fund, http://www1.ncaa.org/finance/revenue_ 
distribution_plan [hereinafter NCAA, Revenue Distribution Plan, Basketball Fund] (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2008); Fatsis, supra note 56 (referring to figures in 2004 MEMBERSHIP 
REPORT, supra note 89, at 24). 
 146. NCAA, Revenue Distribution Plan, Basketball Fund, supra note 145; Thomas 
George, March Madness: Cash Cow Bone Dry for Athletes, DENV. POST, Apr. 3, 2006, at 
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rule, the more teams from a given conference participate in the tournament 
and the further they advance, the more money is distributed from the 
NCAA to that conference.147  Of the $307.6 million available for distribution, 
the remaining $37.4 million was divided among the 326 Division I 
institutions and the 31 Division I conferences.148  In 2007, estimates indicate 
conferences received about $177,000 for each tournament game, other than 
the championship game, that a conference member played in the preceding 
six tournaments,149 for total distributions to all conferences based on 
tournament play aggregating approximately $132.6 million.150 
Selection of tournament participants is accomplished by awarding 
thirty-one of the sixty-four or sixty-five available slots to conference 
champions.151  The other thirty-three or thirty-four available slots are awarded 
to schools on the basis of their demonstrated and perceived basketball 
talent.  And it is not uncommon for most of these remaining at-large slots 
to be filled by teams from the major basketball conferences: the Big Ten, 
ACC, SEC, Big 12, Pacific 10, Big East, and Conference USA.152  The 
system by which teams are selected to compete in the NCAA men’s 
basketball tournament thus not only rewards financially those programs 
that succeed in any given year, it also rewards those that succeed over 
 
D-01; see also Tom Lambert, Spartan Fever: March Madness is Sweeping East Lansing 
as MSU Basketball Takes Center Stage at the Final Four: Fans Revel in Men’s, 
Women’s Success, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 31, 2005, at 1A (confirming also for prior years 
that payment is awarded for each game a conference member played in preceding six 
tournaments other than the championship game); Martin, Big Ten’s Share, supra note 
127 (same); Suggs, supra note 81 (same). 
 147. See Martin, Big Ten’s Share, supra note 127; Martin, supra note 92.  Conferences 
have their own internal agreements governing the distribution of tournament revenues 
among their members.  The Big Ten, for example, divides NCAA tournament receipts 
evenly among its eleven member schools after participating schools’ expenses are paid.  
See id. 
 148. 2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 45, at 19–20, 35. 
 149. NCAA, Revenue Distribution Plan, Basketball Fund, supra note 145; NCAA, 
Distribution of Basketball-Related Funds According to Number of Units by Conference, 
2001–2006, available at http://www1.ncaa.org/finance/bkb_dist.html [hereinafter NCAA, 
Distribution Units by Conference] (last visited July 19, 2007) (on file with author); see 
also Lambert, supra note 146, at 1A (indicating each conference receives multiple payments, 
one for each game any conference member played in the last six tournaments other than 
for the championship games); Suggs, supra note 81 (same). 
 150. NCAA, Revenue Distribution Plan, Basketball Fund, supra note 145; NCAA, 
Distribution Units by Conference, supra note 149. 
 151. See Martin, supra note 92. 
 152. See id. 
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time, providing significant additional incentive to build and maintain 
winning basketball programs. 
Plainly, the successful programs in the best conferences have the greatest 
opportunity to profit from tournament play.  Michigan State University 
was estimated to have received $2 million from the 2003 tournament.  
This amount constituted one quarter of the team’s annual revenue of $8 
million.153 
E.  Colleges and Universities 
1.  Direct Financial Benefits from Successful Athletic Programs 
In addition to harvesting the financial benefit of distributions from the 
NCAA and conferences, colleges and universities with successful athletic 
programs also generate significant revenue directly from their operations.  
The University of Wisconsin’s annual athletic department budget approximates 
$76 million.154  The University of Florida budgets approximately $78 million 
for annual spending on athletics.155  The University of Michigan’s annual 
athletics budget approaches $78.4 million,156 while those at Ohio State 
University and the University of Texas each approximate an astounding 
$90 million.157  Not only are college athletic revenues and spending enormous, 
but they are escalating rapidly.158  For example, from 1995 through 2001, 
athletic budgets at Division I schools increased by twenty-five percent 
while overall spending at those institutions rose by only ten percent.159 
Ticket sales alone generate substantial revenue for universities.  For 
the fall 2006 season, more than 3.6 million fans attended football games 
at the top-five-attended schools.160  The University of Michigan enjoyed 
 
 153. Id.  In 2003–2004, the men’s basketball team at Michigan State University 
generated more than $8.4 million in total revenue.  U.S. Department of Education, Office 
of Postsecondary Education, 2003–2004 Report on Revenues and Expenses for Michigan 
State University, http://www.ope.ed.gov/athletics/InstDetail.asp?CRITERIA=3 (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2005) (on file with author) (showing men’s basketball revenues for Michigan 
State University upon search). 
 154. Charles Elmore, Gator Nation It’s Not Just a Place; It’s a State of Mind, PALM 
BEACH POST, Jan. 7, 2007, at 1A. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Frank, supra note 112, at 3. 
 159. See id.; Mary Jo Sylwester & Thomas Witosky, Athletic Spending Grows as 
Academic Funds Dry Up, USA TODAY, Feb. 18, 2004, available at http://www. 
usatoday.com/sports/college/2004-02-18-athletic-spending-cover_x.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 
2008). 
 160. NCAA, 2006 National College Football Attendance, http://www.ncaa.org/stats/ 
football/attendance/2006/2006_football_attendance.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).  The 
top five attended football programs were Michigan, Penn State, Tennessee, Ohio State, 
and Georgia.  Id. 
MCCORMICK.DOC 9/11/2008  10:33:23 AM 
[VOL. 45:  495, 2008]  The Emperor’s New Clothes 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 521 
the largest per game attendance in the nation with an average in 2006 of 
110,026 fans.161  In fall 2007, football tickets there cost $400 per seat for 
the season.162  Ticket revenues alone could therefore exceed $44 million 
for the year. 
Michigan State University’s Spartan Stadium, a moderately sized 
football stadium by Big Ten standards, seated 75,000 beginning in the 
2005–2006 season.163  Ticket prices have been increasing steadily in recent 
years.164  For the 2005–2006 season, the most recent year for which data 
were available, total football ticket revenue exceeded $12.4 million.165 
In 2006, Division I college basketball games drew more than 25.8 
million attendees.166  At the five universities with the highest average 
attendance per basketball game, over 1.7 million fans attended home 
games,167 an average of almost 20,100 per game.168  The University of 
Kentucky enjoyed the largest average per game attendance.  In the 
2007–2008 season, ticket prices at Kentucky will range from $28 to $33 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Telephone Interview with Univ. of Mich. Athletics Ticket Office, in Ann 
Arbor, Mich. (Aug. 20, 2007). 
 163. Joe Rexrode, MSU Boosts Cost of Football Tickets: Biggest Price Hike will be 
for ‘Premium Games’, LANSING ST. J., Feb. 9, 2005, at C1. 
 164. Individual MSU football tickets will cost $46 each during the 2007–2008 
season.  See Michigan State University, 2007 Michigan State Football tickets (on file 
with author). 
Tickets for one “premium game” against University of Michigan, will cost $70 each in 
the fall 2007 season.  Id.  During the 2004–2005 season of six home games, individual 
tickets for four games were $42 each, but for two “premium games,” those against Notre 
Dame and Ohio State, tickets were $52 per game.  Michigan State University, 2004 
Michigan State Football tickets (on file with author); Barbara Wieland, Spartan-Irish 
Game a Win for Business, LANSING ST. J., Sept. 15, 2004, at 1A.  Thus, when pricing 
tickets, the University took advantage of higher market demand for the more popular 
games, availing itself of the free market, while the NCAA prohibits athletes themselves 
from enjoying that free market.  Premium pricing is used at other universities as well.  
Tickets for the Oklahoma-Texas contest in 2004 cost $85 each and for the Miami-Florida 
State game $75.  Rexrode, supra note 163. 
 165. Michigan State University, Financial Report 2005–2006, Supplement: Other 
Financial Information 36, http://ctlr.msu.edu/download/fa/financialstatements/OFI20052006.pdf  
[hereinafter MSU Financial Report 2005–2006] (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).  Ticket revenue is 
shared with visiting teams, but the University recoups payments by receiving a share of 
their hosts’ revenues at away games.  This figure represents ticket revenues only, and does 
not include any revenue Michigan State University receives from the sale of television 
broadcasting rights.  See id. 
 166. BASKETBALL RECORDS, supra note 139, at 234. 
 167. Id. at 235.  The top five programs in per game attendance were Kentucky, 
Syracuse, North Carolina, Louisville, and Tennessee.  Id. 
 168. See id. 
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per seat.169  With an average per game attendance at Kentucky of 
22,763,170 ticket sales will generate between $637,364 and $751,179 per 
game, for a sum of between $11.47 million and $13.52 million for the 
season.171 
These football and basketball ticket revenue figures do not include seat 
license fees.  At many schools, fans are required to make an additional 
“donation” each year to the university to be eligible to purchase season 
tickets.172  At the University of Kentucky, for example, basketball fans 
in 2006–2007 were required to donate an additional $200 to $1250 per 
seat, each season, to be eligible to buy lower-bowl season tickets.173  
“Premium seating” charges at the most successful football programs are 
much greater, amounting to as much as $25,000 at the University of 
Southern California, and up to $15,000 at the University of Miami.174  At 
the University of Michigan, the per seat surcharge is expected to produce 
 
 169. University of Kentucky Athletic Department, Men’s Basketball Ticket Information, 
http://www.ukathletics.com/index.php?s=&change_well_id=2&url_article_id=11359 [hereinafter 
Kentucky Ticket Information] (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 170. BASKETBALL RECORDS, supra note 139, at 235. 
 171. See Kentucky Ticket Information, supra note 169 (providing University of 
Kentucky 2007–2008 home schedule of eighteen games). 
 172. The $46 or $70 price of each individual fall 2007 football ticket at Michigan 
State University, see 2007 Michigan State Football tickets, supra note 164, does not 
include the mandatory donation required of season ticket holders who purchase seats in 
prime locations.  At Spartan Stadium, those charges range from $200 to $500 per seat 
per year for approximately 15,474 seats.  Michigan State University, Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://msuspartans.cstv.com/tickets/msu-fb-faq.html (last visited on Aug. 20, 
2007) (on file with author) (providing 2007–2008 prices for premium seats); see also 
Todd Schulz, MSU Fans Prove Loyalty, Deserve More, LANSING ST. J., Sept. 11, 2004, 
at 1W (indicating number of seats in premium seating zones).  At the University of 
Michigan, premium seating fees range from $50 per seat in the endzone to $500 per seat 
near the 50-yard line.  University of Michigan, Victors Club—Preferred Seat Donation 
Program, http://www.mgoblue.com/document_display.cfm?document_id=19797 (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2007) (on file with author).  At the University of Notre Dame, they range from 
$500 for an endzone seat to $1,000 for a sideline seat.  Margaret Fosmoe, Season Tickets 
Fee Takes a Jump; ND Raising the Mandatory Donation Amount for Right to Buy, S. 
BEND TRIB., Nov. 10, 2006, at A1. 
 173. University of Kentucky Athletic Department, K-Fund Priority Seating 
Levels/Seating Charts, Chart for Men’s Basketball, Minimum Donation Requirements, 
http://ukathletics.com/index.php?s=&url_channel_id=&url_subchannel_id=&url_article
_id=11372&change_well_id=7 (last visited Aug. 20, 2007) (on file with author) 
(showing per seat donations required for different areas in the lower bowl of Rupp 
Arena); see also University of Kentucky Athletic Department, K Fund Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://ukathletics.com/index.php?s=&url_channel_id=&url_subchannel_id=&url_ 
article_id=11376&change_well_id=7 (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (explaining that per seat 
donations are mandatory and payable each year).  In 2003–2004, Michigan State University 
earned $225,000 from extra seat license fees for the thirty-eight court-side seats in its 
basketball arena.  Joe Rexrode, MSU Sports Budget Back in the Black: Athletic Office 
Reports $600K Profit for ’03–’04, LANSING ST. J., Jan. 20, 2005, at 1A. 
 174. Douglas Lederman, Schools Making Fans Give More to Keep Best Seats; 
Colleges say Donations Needed to Meet Costs, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2004, at A.01. 
MCCORMICK.DOC 9/11/2008  10:33:23 AM 
[VOL. 45:  495, 2008]  The Emperor’s New Clothes 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 523 
no less than $9.5 million in additional annual revenue.175  And new stadium 
construction projects include luxury suites sold each season for tens of 
thousands of dollars.176 
Ticket revenues are hardly the only means, however, by which colleges 
profit directly from successful athletic programs.  Other direct and important 
sources of revenue include the sale of television rights which the universities 
and colleges receive through the NCAA and their conferences,177 the 
sale of food and drink, athletic apparel and other merchandise bearing 
the logo of the school or the number of a star player,178 parking fees, and, 
of course, advertising revenues from the schools’ corporate sponsors or 
“partners.”179 
 
 175. Id.  The University of Kansas will produce some $7 million annually through 
premium seating.  Id. 
 176. A 2005 stadium expansion at Michigan State University included twenty-four 
suites, each of which were offered for between $35,000 and $80,000 annually, and 862 
comfortable “club seats” selling for $4500 to $6500 annually.  Tim Martin & Sharon 
Terlep, MSU Approves $61M Stadium Improvements: 3,000 New Seats, 24 Club Suites 
to be Added by ‘05, LANSING ST. J., Sept. 13, 2003, at 1A.  Corporations regularly rent 
luxury suites to entertain clients and prospects.  See id.  MSU’s “profit goal” from 
seating surcharges, suites, and club seats in Spartan Stadium is $3.5 million annually.  
See Rexrode, supra note 173. 
 177. In 2005–2006, Division I universities received distributions of over $307.6 million 
from the NCAA.  2006 MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 45, at 19.  Most of these funds 
derived from the NCAA’s sale of television broadcasting rights to CBS.  See id. at 18.  
An example of conference distribution of revenues to its members is the Southeastern 
Conference which distributed over $122 million to its twelve member universities in 
2005–2006.  Southeastern Conference, IRS Form 990, EIN 63-0377461, FYE Aug. 31, 
2006 (on file with author).  Much of this revenue came from lucrative multi-year 
broadcasting contracts.  See id. 
 178. See Eitzen, supra note 60, at 27 (estimating $2.5 billion in annual sales of 
licensed college merchandise, generating $100 million for universities annually); id. 
(noting the University of Michigan earns approximately $6 million annually from sales 
of merchandise); Elmore, supra note 154 (describing sudden jumps in apparel sales at 
the University of Florida—$3.2 million—and Ohio State University following major 
athletic victories); George, supra note 146 (asserting that the NCAA and its member 
universities make “a few . . . hundred million” dollars annually “from ticket sales, 
endorsement deals, jersey sales and radio broadcasting deals”); Tim Martin, The Green 
Machine, LANSING ST. J., Dec. 16, 2001, at 1A (noting how MSU’s licensing revenue 
reached a record $1.7 million for the first time following its NCAA men’s basketball title 
in 2000). 
 179. Corporate sponsor Comcast Cable, for example, paid the University of Maryland 
$25 million for naming rights to that school’s basketball arena.  See Editorial, Student-
Athletes, BALT. SUN, May 5, 2004, at 18A.  Value City is paying $12.5 million over 
several years for such rights at Ohio State University.  See Tim Martin, Corporate 
Sponsorships Net Millions for Ohio St., LANSING ST. J., Dec. 16, 2001, at 6A.  At 
Michigan State University, sponsors donated over $2.3 million in 2005–2006 alone for 
the privileges of being recognized and advertising their logos on the scoreboard during 
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2.  Indirect Benefits from Successful Athletic Programs 
The financial gains for NCAA institutions from their football and 
basketball programs are not limited to revenues arising directly from 
their athletic-department operations.  Universities with successful athletic 
programs also derive the ancillary financial benefit of “millions of dollars of 
indirect revenue from alumni donations and increased enrollment.”180  
Laura Freedman’s case study of the University of Maryland demonstrates 
the correlation between success on the playing field and subsequent 
 
games.  MSU Financial Report 2005–2006, supra note 165, at 36; see also Martin, supra 
note 178. 
 180. Schott, supra note 57, at 27; see also JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT’S PERSPECTIVE 9 
(2000) (noting every time the University of Michigan appears in the Rose Bowl or the 
Final Four, admissions applications soar); DALE HOFMANN & MARTIN J. GREENBERG, 
SPORT$BIZ xiv (1989) (noting that when Oklahoma won a national football title in 1985, 
donations to the university rose $2.4 million); Robert A. Baade & Jeffrey O. Sundberg, 
Fourth Down and Gold to Go? Assessing the Link between Athletics and Alumni Giving, 
77 SOC. SCI. Q. 789 (1996) (finding Bowl Game appearances and participation in the 
NCAA basketball tournament each result in significantly higher alumni gifts); Cletus C. 
Coughlin & O. Homer Erekson, An Examination of Contributions to Support Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 51 S. ECON. J. 180, 194 (1984) (reporting positive relationship between athletic 
success and alumni giving); Brian Goff, Effects of University Athletics on the University: 
A Review and Extension of Empirical Assessment, 14 J. OF SPORT MGMT. 85, 101 (2000) 
(reporting positive relationship between athletic success and alumni giving); Goldman, 
supra note 25, at 206, 212 n.57 (postulating that star athletes indirectly increase revenues 
by creating positive exposure for the school that increases applications and alumni 
contributions); Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the Professionalization 
of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 35, 44 n.39 (concluding that successful athletics 
programs benefit universities in terms of exposure and increased donations); Lee Siegelman 
& Samuel Brookheimer, Is It Whether You Win or Lose? Monetary Contributions to Big-
Time College Athletic Programs, 64 SOC. SCI. Q. 347, 355 (1983) (finding donations to 
university athletic programs increase by $125,000 in 1983 dollars following a ten percent 
increase in football winning percentage over a four-year period); Peter Alfano, Academic 
Elite Using Sports Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1989, at D25–26; Martin, supra note 92; 
Tim Martin, Spartan Football Program Boosts Visibility for MSU, LANSING ST. J., Aug. 
30, 2003, at 1A (describing increases in student applications following athletic success at 
numerous universities); Joe Rexrode, Double Threat: MSU Men’s and Women’s 
Basketball Teams Pack One-Two Punch Rarely Seen on Court, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 13, 
2005, at 1A; Dodd, supra note 112.  But see SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 65, at 255 
(describing lack of evidence supporting increases in alumni giving following athletic 
success); Frank, supra note 112, at 33 (arguing “[a]lumni donations and applications for 
admission sometimes rise in the wake of conspicuously successful seasons at a small 
number of institutions, but such increases are likely to be both small and transitory”); 
Telander, Something Must Be Done, supra note 53, at 103–04 (reviewing studies 
suggesting donations to academic programs do not always result from success in athletic 
programs); cf. ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., THE EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS: AN INTERIM REPORT, COMMISSIONED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION 5–6 (2003), http://www.ncaa.org/databases/baselineStudy/baseline.pdf (finding 
in the medium term no positive or negative relationship between changes in football and 
basketball spending and incoming student-body SAT scores; also finding no robust 
relationship between changes in football and basketball spending and alumni giving). 
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growth in the number of student applications, consequent improvements 
in the quality of students admitted,181 and increases in alumni donations.  
Freedman tracked enrollment applications, the quality of entering students, 
and general revenues at the University of Maryland, a large Division I 
school, and correlated them to periods of particular success in football 
and men’s basketball.182 
Following several mediocre seasons,183 the Maryland football team 
excelled in its 2001–2002 season and received a coveted Orange Bowl 
invitation.184  The following season was also successful and culminated 
in the team’s victory in the Peach Bowl.185  “During the same time period, 
the [men’s] basketball team dramatically improved, . . . made Maryland’s 
first appearance in the NCAA National Tournament Final Four, and won 
[its] . . . first national basketball championship.”186  Simultaneously, the 
university experienced a thirty-eight percent increase in its total revenues.187  
“In particular, the categories of revenue representing sales of Maryland 
memorabilia and licensing, and private donations [grew by] . . . $10,004,293 
and $11,481,954, respectively, between the 1999 and 2003 fiscal years,”188 
representing a 7.2% growth in memorabilia sales189 and a 27.8% increase in 
private donations.190 
Freedman also documented improvement in the student body’s academic 
quality during and following the period of athletic success resulting from 
 
 181. See Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and 
NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 699–702 
(2003); see also PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 796 (2d ed. 
1998) (asserting that Patrick Ewing’s performance at Georgetown University for four 
years helped generate a forty-seven percent increase in the number of applications and a 
forty-point increase in its freshman SAT scores); Martin, supra note 92 (noting that 
Michigan State University applications rose seven percent the year after the men’s 
basketball team won a national championship). 
 182. See Freedman, supra note 181, at 699–702. 
 183. See id. at 700 (noting the record for the Maryland football team in 1998–1999 
was 3-8, and that in 1999–2000 and again in 2000–2001, it was 5-6). 
 184. The Maryland Terrapins lost to Florida in that game.  See Fox Sports on MSN, 
Bowl Championship Series, BCS, Alliance & Coalition Games Year-By-Year, available 
at http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/timeline (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 185. ESPN, Peach Bowl History, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/bowls04/story? 
page=peach_history (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 186. Freedman, supra note 181, at 702. 
 187. Id. at 700.  Revenues for 2003 were $1,155,364,083 and for 1999 were $836,612,738.  
Id. 
 188. Id. at 702. 
 189. See id. at 700. 
 190. See id. 
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an increase in the number of student applications:191 high school grade 
point averages and SAT scores of entering students were significantly 
higher.192  Under such circumstances, universities may elect to enroll either 
the same number of students and thus become more selective, or more 
students thereby enhancing tuition revenue.  Either choice is highly desirable 
to any institution. 
Other universities have also enjoyed increases in donations and applications 
following successful athletic seasons.  Gifts to Michigan State University 
doubled after its Spartan basketball program became a regular contender 
for the national championship title.193  In 2000, the year MSU won that 
honor, the university raised a record-breaking $202 million in donations, 
student applications grew by seven percent, and licensing revenue 
exceeded $1 million for the first time in university history.194  Similarly, 
Boston College enjoyed a remarkable twelve percent increase in 
applications in the year following Doug Flutie’s memorable forty-eight 
yard touchdown pass to defeat the University of Miami as time expired 
in the game.195 
The revenues universities enjoy from their sports programs are created 
largely by the efforts of individual players.  “Top college football players 
can generate more than $500,000 in annual revenues for their universities”196 
and “top men’s basketball players . . . more than a million dollars each 
year.”197  “[I]t has been estimated that Patrick Ewing generated $12.3 million 
for Georgetown University through increased attendance, television, and 
NCAA tournament revenues during his four years on the Hoya basketball 
team.”198 
In major professional sports, players’ financial worth to the enterprise, 
namely their combined salaries, are usually measured at slightly more 
than half of league revenues.199  The NBA salary cap, for example, has 
 
 191. See id. at 703.  The quality of the student body improves, it is thought, because 
athletic success generates more interest in the school among potential applicants.  The 
number of applications increases, and the university may admit a smaller percentage, and 
more highly credentialed group, of applicants. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See Martin, supra note 92. 
 194. Id.; Rexrode, supra note 180.  Although University officials “are hesitant to 
attribute all the growth to sports success, . . . they know it helps.”  Martin, supra note 92. 
 195. FRANK, supra note 112, at 25. 
 196. Riggs, supra note 61, at 142 (citing Jonathan Marshall, Studies Say that Colleges 
Exploit Athletes, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 12, 1993, at E1); see also Farrey, supra note 72 
(acknowledging the athlete helps to generate the revenues enjoyed by universities). 
 197. Riggs, supra note 61, at 142 (citing Marshall, supra note 196); see also Lynch, 
supra note 56, at 617–18. 
 198. Riggs, supra note 6161, at 142 (citing Pat Ewing Made Money for His College 
Team Too, JET, Jan. 20, 1986, at 49). 
 199. See Farrey, supra note 72. 
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recently been set at sixty-one percent of league revenues.200  Using this 
measure, Syracuse University’s twelve scholarship basketball players 
would each have been worth $488,000 during the 2002–2003 season, 
roughly $458,543 more than their annual scholarship.201  Over a four-year 
college athletic career, each Syracuse scholarship player would have earned 
approximately $1.8 million more than the value of his scholarship.202  
Under this same formula, basketball players at Michigan State University 
were worth, on average, $345,666 in 2002–2003, or $1.3 million over a 
four-year period,203 while at Duke University, each player’s annual 
worth would have been $396,500, or $1.5 million over four years; at the 
University of Maryland, $376,166, or $1.4 million over the four-year 
period of eligibility; and at the University of Arizona, $508,333, or $2 
million over a four-year college career.204 
Of course, by focusing solely upon the “student” in student-athlete 
rather than the financial value each player brings, the NCAA has 
succeeded in maintaining a regime in which players can be paid no more 
than scholarships, thus reserving the vast remaining wealth for itself and 
its member institutions.  Not only do these institutions take for themselves 
the wealth their athletes generate, but they do so free of taxation. 
F.  Coaches and Other Individuals 
While colleges and universities reap fabulous profits from their 
athletics businesses, a great many individuals, although not the players 
themselves,205 also gain from this munificent enterprise.  Coaches’ salaries 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.; see Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Intercollegiate Sports, in RETHINKING 
COLLEGE ATHLETICS 197, 205–06 (Judith Andre & David N. James eds., 1991) (estimating 
one player’s annual worth to a university at $200,000 and the average profit to universities 
from “good” players to be about $150,000 per year); Robert W. Brown, An Estimate of 
the Rent Generated by a Premium College Football Player, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 671, 679 
(1993) (estimating value generated by a top-level football athlete to a university at 
$2 million over a four-year period). 
 205. Of course, grant-in-aid athletes obtain financial benefit through their scholarships, 
but this source of compensation is limited arbitrarily by agreement among the colleges 
and universities, is often lower than a fair market wage, and bears no relation to the 
athletic abilities of any given player.  See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, arts. 12.1.1, 
15.01.2, 15.1.  Were college athletics properly considered to be a commercial, rather than 
amateur, activity, this form of price fixing would be subject to antitrust scrutiny.  See 
supra Part II.B.  Not only the amount of compensation, but its form—the grant-in-aid—
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and those of other administrators have become professionalized.  College 
coaches are now regularly represented by professional agents who negotiate 
lucrative financial agreements, both from universities and through 
sponsorship arrangements.206 
A recent example of this extravagant trend is that of Tubby Smith, 
former University of Kentucky head basketball coach.207  In 2003, Coach 
Smith signed an eight-year contract extension.208  Under the agreement, 
he earned a base annual salary of $200,000.209  Had he stayed at 
Kentucky through 2007, he would have received a $1.5 million bonus,210 
and remaining through 2011 would have entitled him to an additional 
$2.5 million.211  More lucrative for Coach Smith, however, was the 
income he enjoyed from television, shoe, and apparel deals, beginning at 
$1.55 million for the 2003–2004 season and set to increase to $2.175 
million by 2010–2011.212  Of course, these amounts were in addition to 
his University of Kentucky salary and bonuses, so his total minimum 
earnings over the eight-year period would have been $20,250,000213—
an average of more than $2.53 million each year. 
In addition to this compensation, Coach Smith was also entitled to a 
country club membership,214 two cars,215 and substantial additional bonuses 
and benefits.  He was to earn $50,000 for each NCAA Final Four 
appearance,216 another $50,000 each year the team met certain academic 
 
is dictated by agreement among NCAA members.  See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, 
arts. 2.9, 12.1.2. 
 206. See, e.g., Riggs, supra note 61, at 139. 
 207. Coach Smith left Kentucky in 2007 and is currently the head basketball coach 
at the University of Minnesota.  Steve Lannen & Delano Massey, Gillispie Calls His 
New Gig at Kentucky the ‘Best Job’, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2007, at 6. 
 208. See Mike Fish, Sweet Deals: More and More College Coaches are Making 
CEO Money, SI.COM, June 2, 2003, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/ 
college/news/2003/05/30/bkb_coaching_salaries/ and at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/ 
college/news/2003/06/02/contracts/#kentucky (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Over the eight-year period, Coach Smith would have received: $1.55 million in 
2003–2004; $1.625 million in 2004–2005; $1.7 million in 2005–2006; $1.775 million in 
2006–2007; $1.85 million in 2007–2008; $1.925 million in 2008–2009; $2.05 million in 
2009–2010; and $2.175 million in 2010–2011.  Id. 
Under shoe and apparel deals, the manufacturer compensates the coach through his 
university and provides the team with its uniforms and shoes.  These items include the 
manufacturer’s logo, and in this regard, the apparel maker pays the coach to transform 
the athlete into “a walking billboard.”  See Nike Scores: ‘Swoosh’ Gets Too Much Play, 
LANSING ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at 6A. 
 213. Fish, supra note 208. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. 
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goals,217 a $15,000 bonus for winning the SEC championship,218 and 
another $15,000 for qualifying for the NCAA basketball tournament.219  
At the same time, he was not required to compensate the university for 
leaving before the end of his contract.220  Had the university terminated 
his services, however, he would have received a $1 million buyout 
payment.221  Finally, all salary and benefits were to be provided even if 
Coach Smith had become disabled or died.222 
 
 217. This bonus would have been earned if the team GPA was at least 3.0 and if at 
least ninety percent of players met NCAA satisfactory progress requirements.  See id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  Coach Smith also received: “20 prime, lower level basketball tickets and 8 
football tickets; 4 weeks paid vacation; [u]se of facilities to conduct basketball camps; 
. . . $50,000 from his basketball camp [for one] year; $15,000 to appear at Michael 
Jordan’s basketball camp; [and] $5,000 for a speaking appearance by the U.S. Navy and 
Department of Defense.”  Id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id.  While Coach Smith’s Kentucky contract is a brilliant example of 
lucrative coaching salaries, it is hardly the only such arrangement.  For example, former 
Iowa State basketball coach, Larry Eustachy, earned $1.1 million in 2003, four times the 
salary of the university president, making him the highest paid public employee in the 
state of Iowa.  Id.  It is typical for head coaches at public universities to earn more than 
the governors of their states.  See Study Shows It Pays Better to Be Izzo and Carr than 
Governor Granholm, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.freep.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070830/SPORTS/70830010/1055 (on file with author) (citing 
study stating this pattern exists in every state except Alaska where college football is not 
played). 
Other examples of lucrative contract provisions in college basketball abound.  The 
University of Kansas paid men’s basketball coach Bill Self’s buyout obligation of 
$500,000 to the University of Illinois, his former employer.  See Fish, supra note 208.  
Kansas currently pays him $1.64 million annually, exclusive of compensation he receives 
through shoe contracts and summer camps.  See Kirk Bohls, Arms Race is Escalating in 
College Hoops, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Mar. 31, 2007, at B01. 
The most lucrative component of the above-described compensation tends to be the 
benefits coaches earn from television and apparel arrangements with sporting goods 
manufacturers.  See Fish, supra note 208.  For coaches at elite programs, these arrangements 
often dwarf their base university salaries.  See id. 
The figures provided above do not include other generous fringe benefits typical in 
such contracts.  These benefits include use of campus facilities for profitable summer 
athletic camps, courtesy cars, country club memberships, expense accounts, premium 
tickets to basketball and football games, travel for spouse and family members, and 
lucrative bonuses for succeeding, or even participating, in tournaments.  See id. 
MSU basketball coach, Tom Izzo, was the beneficiary of a privately funded 
$4.9 million bonus when he remained at MSU through the 2005–2006 season.  National 
Association of Basketball Coaches, Michigan State Moves to Keep Izzo, Nov. 8, 2001, 
available at http://nabc.ocsn.com/sports/m-baskbl/spec-rel/110801acc.html (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2003) (on file with author).  This amount was in addition to his annual salary of 
more than $1.6 million under a 2004 contract which included revenue from “a sneaker 
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Since 2003, the salaries of college basketball coaches have only continued 
to increase.  Currently, at least twenty Division I-A basketball coaches 
make at least $1 million annually.223  The average salary, excluding 
benefits, incentives, and other perquisites, for those in the elite basketball 
conferences—the ACC, Big 12, Big East, Big Ten, Pacific 10, and 
SEC—is $1.2 million per year.224  Billie Gillispie, the current head basketball 
coach at the University of Kentucky, earns over $2 million annually.225  
The University of Louisville pays Rick Pitino from $2.25 to $2.5 million 
in annual compensation in addition to loyalty bonuses for remaining at 
the school.226  His total annual compensation, including estimated shoe, 
apparel, and other outside income of $1.5 million, is approximately 
$4 million.227  Roy Williams earns an average of $2.6 million annually at 
the University of North Carolina,228 and Billy Donovan recently signed a 
six-year contract, with a seventh-year option at the University of Florida 
for $3.5 million per year.229 
Football coaches, too, garner immense profits from the industry of 
college sports.  In 2002, the average annual compensation for head football 
coaches at BCS conference universities approximated $1 million.230  By 
2005, at least nine Division I-A football coaches earned more than $2 
million annually, and some thirty-five made at least $1 million.231  The 
next year, 2006–2007, at least forty-two Division I-A coaches made at 
least $1 million.232 
 
deal, media appearances, and running basketball camps.”  Lambert, supra note 146.  By 
taking his 2004–2005 basketball team to the Final Four, Coach Izzo earned a $96,000 
bonus.  Id.  His bonuses in 2006 amounted to $5.8 million for total compensation that 
year of over $7 million.  Steve Wieberg & Jodi Upton, Tournament Success Brings Financial 
Windfall for Coaches, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2007, at 1A.  Izzo will earn another 
$4 million bonus if he stays at MSU through April of 2010.  Id. 
 223. Wieberg & Upton, supra note 222. 
 224. Compensation for Division I Men’s Basketball Coaches; What the Coaches 
Earn at the 65 Schools that Played in the 2006 NCAA Tournament, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 
2007, at C8. 
 225. Robbi Pickeral, Heels Reward Williams; Roy Williams’ Four-Year Extension 
Through 2014–15 Ups His Salary to About $2.6 Million a Year, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, 
May 18, 2007, at C1. 
 226. The Highlights, THE YORK DISPATCH, May 4, 2007.  Pitino received a loyalty bonus 
of $1.75 million on July 1, 2007, and will receive additional bonuses of $3.6 million if he 
stays at the University of Louisville through 2010 and 2013.  Id. 
 227. Wieberg & Upton, supra note 222. 
 228. Pickeral, supra note 225. 
 229. Andy Staples, Coaches Agree to New Contracts, TAMPA TRIB., June 8, 2007, at 4. 
 230. Randy Peterson, McCarney’s Boss Says: Increase Would Match Average 
Salary for Coaches in BCS Conferences, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 6, 2002, at 4C.  This 
figure included base salary and other compensation from media and apparel contracts.  
See FRANK, supra note 112, at 11. 
 231. Dodd, supra note 112. 
 232. Wieberg & Upton, supra note 222. 
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William “Mack” Brown’s 2004–2014 contract to coach football at the 
University of Texas will bring him $26 million over its ten-year life.233  
Coach Brown’s contract includes a $60,000 “personal allowance,” a 
$300,000 special annual payment, $80,000 from a summer camp, and a 
one-time birthday bonus of $1.6 million.234  In 2007, the university agreed 
to extend this contract through 2016, increasing Brown’s annual salary 
to more than $3 million by 2008 and promising him bonuses totaling $3 
million for staying through January 1, 2010.235 
A growing number of college football coaches now earn in excess of 
$3 million annually.  For example, Urban Meyer recently signed a six-
year contract with a seventh-year option paying $3.25 million a year at 
the University of Florida.236  University of Oklahoma football coach, 
Bob Stoops, earned $3.45 million in the 2006–2007 season.237  Charlie Weis, 
at the University of Notre Dame, is reportedly being paid approximately $3.5 
million annually under his ten-year contract.238  These salary and benefit 
packages for college football and basketball coaches are CEO-like in 
their magnitude.  Indeed, they exceed the annual salaries of the CEO’s of 
major corporations such as Navistar International, Mellon Financial, 
Ebay, Goodrich, Rite Aid, Office Depot, Delphi, and The Gap.239 
Incredibly, college coaches sometimes make as much as or even more 
than their professional counterparts.  In 2002, Marvin Lewis turned down an 
 
 233. Dodd, supra note 112. 
 234. Mike Fish, Sign of the Times: College Football Coaching Contracts Filled 
with Lucrative Incentives, insert on Coaching Contracts, SI.COM, Dec. 23, 2003, available 
at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/writers/mike_fish/12/19/coaching.contracts/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2008). 
 235. Texas Gives Mack Brown Raise, Extension, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2007, at D1. 
 236. Staples, supra note 229. 
 237. Greg Johnson, Coaches’ Pay Puts Colleges to the Test, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2007, at A1; Erik Spanberg, Meet the Millionaire Next Door: Coach, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Jan. 26, 2007, at 11. 
 238. Johnson, supra note 237.  At Louisiana State University, football coach Les 
Miles negotiated a contract provision that could make him one of the highest paid 
coaches in the country.  Under his contract, if he wins ten games in a season, LSU must 
pay him at a level high enough to ensure him the fifth-highest salary in the SEC.  Jodi 
Upton, Contract Could Bring Congressional Inquiry; Administrators Worried about 
Rollover Effect, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2007, at 9C.  If he wins a national championship, he 
is guaranteed the salary required to make him the country’s third-highest-paid coach.  Id. 
 239. See SPECIAL REPORT: CEO COMPENSATION, FORBES.COM (Scott DeCarlo ed., 
2005), http://www.forbes.com/2005/04/20/05ceoland.html (follow “total compensation” 
hyperlink under “Sort List By”) (revealing companies compensating CEOs at less than 
$3 million annually); accord Tim Wendel, Pay the Players, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 2005, 
at 23A (describing head coaches’ salaries as “CEO-like”). 
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offer of $1.5 million to be the head football coach at Michigan State 
University, opting instead to accept a five-year position with the Cincinnati 
Bengals for the same annual salary.240  Shortly thereafter, Michigan 
State reached a six-year agreement with John L. Smith to coach the team 
for $1.625 million annually.241  Most famously, in 2007 the University 
of Alabama lured football coach Nick Saban with an offer worth as 
much as $4.8 million per year, including bonuses, from the NFL where 
he had earned only $4.5 million a year.242  The eight-year, $32 million 
compensation arrangement at the university also gave Coach Saban a 
variety of bonuses, the use of a skybox at Bryant-Denny Stadium, twelve 
general admission tickets, two cars, a country club membership, and the 
use of a private plane for vacations with up to twenty-five hours of flight 
time per year.243 
Given the increase in college coaching salaries toward and sometimes 
beyond NFL levels, the purported distinction between so-called amateur 
sports at the college level and post-college professional sports has 
become blurred and of little meaning except that players in professional 
sports are acknowledged to be employees and are paid,244 while players 
in the university setting are denied the financial fruits of their labors.245  
In all other respects, college athletics is as professionalized as its counterpart, 
the professional leagues. 
Coaches are not the only individuals in the college sports industry 
whose remuneration has risen meteorically.  In 1990–1991, the Division 
I-A conference commissioners earned an average base salary of $133,000,246 
 
 240. See Kevin Goheen, It’s Lewis, CINCINNATI POST, Jan. 15, 2003, at A1 (noting 
Lewis’ annual salary with the Bengals would be $1.5 million); Ken Murray, Bengals 
Give Lewis Call He’s Awaited; Onetime Ravens Architect Takes Over 2-14 Cincinnati, 
Ends Wait to be Head Coach—“There Is No Perfect Situation” Third Black Coach in 
NFL, He Gets Five-Year Contract, BALT. SUN, Jan. 15, 2003, at 1C (noting Lewis turned 
down a $1.5 million offer from Michigan State University). 
 241. See Jack Ebling, Smith’s Deal at $9.75M, LANSING ST. J., Dec. 24, 2002, at 1C. 
 242. See Spanberg, supra note 237; Andrew Zimbalist, Looks Like a Business; Should 
Be Taxed Like One, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at 9. 
 243. See Robyn Norwood, Morning Briefing; Can All This Money Turn the Tide?, 
L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2007, at D2.  The contract included $700,000 in bonuses, including 
a $400,000 bonus for winning a national championship.  Id.  Under the contract, Saban 
may leave the University of Alabama without incurring a financial penalty.  See id. 
 244. The average NFL player earned nearly $1,400,000 in 2005.  Michael J. 
Duberstein, NFLPA Research Department, Omnibus NFL 2005 Mid-Season Salary 
Averages & Signing Trends 1 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.nflpa.org/pdfs/shared/ 
2005_Mid-Season_Omnibus_Salary_Averages_&_Signing_Trends_November_2005.pdf  
(last visited Mar. 6, 2008). 
 245. See Tim Martin & Todd Schulz, Replacing Williams Could Cost MSU $1M, 
LANSING ST. J., Nov. 17, 2002, at 1A (quoting Richard Sheehan, Notre Dame University 
economist: “You can’t pay players, . . . [s]o you pay for a coach who can attract the 
players.”). 
 246. BYERS, supra note 16, at 366. 
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ranging from a low of $95,000 to a high of $170,000,247 with additional 
benefits typically including new cars, memberships at private clubs, 
low-cost and interest-free home loans, and generous contributions to 
annuity pensions.248  After the commissioners learned the 1992–1993 NCAA 
Executive Director’s salary was $461,202,249 they negotiated increases 
for themselves.250  In 1993–1994, “Jim Delany of the Big Ten Conference, 
was receiving a base salary of $230,000, a generous retirement contribution, 
a $15,000 housing supplement, a $250,000 life insurance policy, a free 
automobile, . . . athletics and private social club memberships, . . . [and] 
[f]ree spouse travel to several events.”251  By 2005–2006, however, Delany 
earned almost $1 million annually.252  In that same year, ACC Commissioner 
John Swofford earned almost $760,000.253 
NCAA executives are also compensated handsomely.  In 2004–2005, 
the most recent year for which NCAA salary data are available, the four 
NCAA officers and directors in paid positions earned a combined total 
of almost $2.2 million.254  Executive Director Myles Brand, alone, earned in 
excess of $870,000 that year.255  Moreover, the top-five-paid employees 
other than officers and directors earned combined total compensation 
that year in excess of $1.53 million,256 an average of almost $307,000 
per person. 
Likewise, in the early 1990s, staff sizes increased in Division I-A 
athletics departments, conferences, and the NCAA.257  This growth reflected 
increased revenues available to expand operations and hire additional 
staff.  From 1986 to 1990, the number of staff positions at the Southeastern 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. See id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Suggs, supra note 81 (noting most conference commissioners earn large salaries). 
 251. BYERS, supra note 16, at 367. 
 252. The Big Ten Conference, Inc., IRS Form 990, EIN 36-3640583, FYE June 30, 
2006 (on file with author).  These earnings were comprised of: a base salary of $906,156, 
employee benefit plan contributions of $29,650, as well as an expense account of another 
$23,430.  Id. 
 253. Atlantic Coast Conference, IRS Form 990, EIN 56-0599082, FYE June 30, 
2006 (on file with author).  His earnings included: $473,519 in base salary; $240,958 in 
employee-benefit-plan contributions; and a $45,494 expense account.  Id. 
 254. National Collegiate Athletic Association, IRS Form 990, EIN 44-0567264, 
FYE Aug. 31, 2005 (on file with author). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See BYERS, supra note 16, at 367. 
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Conference, for example, increased by fifty-four percent.258  From 1987 
to the mid 1990s, the number of full-time salaried staff positions at the 
NCAA grew by eighty percent.259  At Division I-A schools, the number 
of staff positions in athletic departments increased from the late 1980s to 
the early 1990s by thirty percent or more.260  A truly amateur enterprise 
could never afford such rapid expansion. 
The college sports industry is sufficiently profitable not only to provide 
exorbitant salaries to coaches, conference commissioners, NCAA executives, 
and university athletic directors, but also to employ large staffs.  This 
industry financially supports tens of thousands of people and their families.  
It does not, however, similarly benefit the players themselves, many of 
whom have families of their own.  In case after case, a gross imbalance 
exists between athletic staff compensation and athlete compensation as 
measured by financial aid.261  For example, “[f]or the fiscal year ended 
June 30, 1992, Oklahoma Sooner sports expenditures totaled $20.6 million.  
Of that amount, thirty-eight percent ($7.5 million) went for salaries, 
wages, and benefits while only nine percent ($1.9 million)262 was spent 
on athletes’ financial aid.”263  At “[o]ne of the richest . . . Big Eight 
[football] teams[,] . . . Nebraska[,] . . . [f]inancial aid to athletes ($2.4 
million) [in 1990–1991] accounted for only 15.0 percent of expenditures 
while staff salaries, wages, and benefits amounted to $6.0 million or 
38.5 percent.”264  At Michigan State University in 2005–2006, financial 
aid awarded to football players, $2.01 million, was less than a quarter of 
total football expenditures of $8.62 million, while staff salaries and 
 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id.; 2 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE 
SPORTS INDUSTRIES 67 (1986); Goldman, supra note 25, at 211 n.56 (noting large 
increase in size of NCAA enforcement staff during 1980s). 
 260. BYERS, supra note 16, at 367.  In 2002, the Ohio State University Athletic 
Department had 220 full-time employees.  Welch Suggs, How Gears Turn at a Sports 
Factory, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 29, 2002, at A32.  In 2003–2004, the University of 
Tennessee Athletic Department had 255 full-time employees.  WILLIAM F. FOX & BRIAN C. 
HILL, CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, 
KNOXVILLE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, KNOXVILLE, ATHLETIC 
DEPARTMENT 9 (2004), available at http://www.cber.utk.edu/pubs/utkadimp04.pdf. 
 261. In the mid-1990s it was reported that “only eighteen percent of athletic 
expenses represent[ed] scholarships; whereas thirty-one percent [was] spent on employee 
benefits and salaries.”  Riggs, supra note 61, at 139 (citing Matt Schultz, College Sports 
Reap Profits, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 1, 1994, at 4); see BYERS, supra note 16, at 224–25 
(reporting the University of Michigan spent only nineteen percent of its athletic budget 
in 1988 on grants-in aid). 
 262. This scholarship figure is based on tuition levels, not on the university’s actual 
cost of enrolling the athlete.  The true cost to the college of providing an extra seat in the 
classroom is much lower than tuition.  Therefore, the actual costs universities incur in 
compensating athletes are even lower than the amounts these tuition figures represent. 
 263. BYERS, supra note 16, at 367. 
 264. Id. at 367–68. 
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fringe benefits, $4.44 million, accounted for more than half of total 
costs.265  In the same year, MSU’s basketball allocation for athletes was 
$282,048, a mere 7.1% of total expenditures of $3,922,708, while staff 
salaries and benefits approximated $2.71 million, a staggering sixty-nine 
percent of total expenses.266  In each case, the acknowledged employees, 
the athletic department staff, receive significantly more aggregate 
remuneration than do the players themselves—those who most directly 
create the product being sold.267 
 
 265. MSU Financial Report 2005–2006, supra note 165, at 36. 
 266. Id. 
 267. By contrast, in professional sports the opposite is true.  Professional player 
salaries are commonly capped at over half of total revenues.  See Farrey, supra note 72.  
This means that in the aggregate, professional athletes earn significantly more than do 
professional leagues’ coaches, administrators, and staff. 
Even when college coaches or athletic directors flout the rules they promise to uphold, 
they nevertheless continue to reap financial rewards.  For example, in the mid-1980s 
after numerous NCAA rules violations were discovered at Southern Methodist University, 
ultimately leading to the NCAA’s imposition of “the death penalty,” disgraced athletic 
director Hitch resigned his position on the condition that his contract be honored in full.  
See BYERS, supra note 16, at 32.  Hitch was paid despite clauses in his contract requiring 
him “to comply with regulations of the NCAA, the Southwest Conference, and SMU.”  
Id.  Hitch’s termination payments two decades ago amounted to $246,442.  Id.  SMU 
head football coach Collins received more than double that, $556,272, and even assistant 
coach Parker was paid $60,299.  Id.  In 2003, when University of Georgia coach Jim 
Harrick resigned amid scandal, he received more than $254,000 under a resignation 
agreement.  Harrick Steps Down as Coach of Georgia, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 
28, 2003, at D3. 
By contrast, if athletes violate NCAA rules, they can be banished through loss of 
eligibility to play at any university and through revocation of their scholarships.  While 
players can thus be fired for violating NCAA or school rules, their coaches’ contracts are 
often honored when they violate such requirements.  Moreover, while coaching contracts 
commonly contain buyout clauses, the athletes’ grant-in-aid forms cannot.  See DIV. I 
MANUAL, supra note 13, arts. 12.1.2, 12.1.2.1 (prohibiting athlete “pay” and imposing 
loss of amateur status for violation of that rule).  In fact, if an athlete transfers to another 
university, he loses at least one year of his four years of playing eligibility, see id. arts. 
14.2, 14.2.1, 14.2.1.1, 14.5.1, in a form of noncompete arrangement that is never imposed on 
coaches. 
Other perquisites of employment commonly enjoyed by coaches and others in the 
college sports industry, see BYERS, supra note 16, at 128, would violate NCAA rules if 
provided to the athletes themselves. 
No-cost autos still are unacceptable as perks for grant-in-aid athletes but they 
are regularly accepted for advertising or prime ticket trade-outs by today’s 
college managers.  Free cars are considered an extra employee benefit for coaches, 
athletics department employees, conference officials, and NCAA staffers.  For 
example, . . . [the estimated value of cars dealers donated to] University of 
Kansas athletics department personnel [in 1990–1991 was] . . . $175,100. 
Id. at 128–29 (citing Schehrer, Bennett and Lowenthal, CPA, memorandum to Dr. Gene 
A. Budig, as part of the 1990–1991 audit of the University of Kansas Athletic Corporation 
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By themselves, the remarkable sums of money being earned by coaches 
and others show the commercial character of major college sports.  
Contrasting these expenditures with those made for athletes reveals that 
college sports are not only commercial, but their profits are enhanced at 
the expense of the athletes whose interests they claim to protect.  Moreover, 
funds which could otherwise have been used for the tax-exempt, public 
purpose of education are instead furthering the private, non-exempt 
interests of coaches and athletic industry executives.  Their excessive salaries 
constitute prohibited private inurement, suggesting that university athletic 
revenues should be subject to taxation. 
G.  Corporate Sponsorships and Advertising 
The proliferation of corporate sponsors is another important way in 
which college sports have become nakedly commercialized.  Such corporations 
make donations to teams, universities, conferences, tournaments, and bowl 
game committees in exchange for recognition during athletic events as 
corporate sponsors or corporate “partners” of the institution.268  In doing 
so, they enjoy promotional association with a favorite university, bowl 
game, or conference, and simultaneously advertise their product to a 
loyal fan base.269  The NCAA, for example, received many millions of 
dollars in the mid-1990s from each of twenty “official N.C.A.A. corporate 
partners.”270  In 1997, General Motors negotiated a sponsorship arrangement 
 
statement of revenues and expenditures for the year ended June 30, 1991).  If a player 
accepted such benefits, it would render him ineligible to play for having violated the 
NCAA’s rules on amateurism.  See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 12.1.2; BYERS, 
supra note 16, at 124–28 (discussing NCAA suspicions that Wilt Chamberlain had been 
impermissibly paid for his services as a college athlete with two new Oldsmobiles); id. at 
171–72 (discussing common practice of cars being provided to recruited athletes); Mike 
Freeman, Buckeyes Suspend Clarett for Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at D1 (describing 
Maurice Clarett’s suspension from the Ohio State University football team when 
allegations surfaced that he had been given special treatment in classes, misstated the 
value of property stolen from his borrowed car, and had been improperly granted the use 
of that vehicle by a local car dealer). 
 268. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 60, at 126–48; Andrew F. Hamm, HP Kicks in Big 
Bucks for Bowl, SILICON VALLEY/SAN JOSE BUS. J., Dec. 12, 2003, at 3; Jennifer Lee, 
MasterCard Finds an Opportunity Deep in the Heart of Texas, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS J., Nov. 24–30, 2003, at 22; Pedersen, supra note 114; Tony Quesada, 
Toyota Sponsorship Shifted Gator Bowl into High Gear, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J., Dec. 24, 
2004, at 11, available at http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2004/12/ 
27/focus1.html.  As long ago as the late 1980s, Georgia Tech sold corporate sponsorships for 
its home games ranging from $75,000 to $175,000 per game.  See Telander, Something 
Must Be Done, supra note 53, at 105. 
 269. See Hamm, supra note 268; Lee, supra note 268, at 22; Quesada, supra note 268. 
 270. Stuart Elliott, The N.C.A.A. Basketball Tourney Has Graduated to the Ranks of 
Major Sports-Marketing Events, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at D7.  Sponsors included 
General Mills, Gillette, Hershey Foods, Pepsico, Sprint, General Motors, Ford Motor, 
Microsoft, AT&T, Anheuser-Busch, Nike, and Penzoil.  See id. 
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under which it would pay the NCAA $20 million over five years.271  
Athletic conferences have also reported significant revenues from sponsors, 
with the Southeastern Conference receiving more than $1.9 million in 
sponsorship royalties in 2005–2006272 and the Big East Conference 
earning corporate sponsorships of almost $1.5 million that same year.273 
The athletic department of the University of Colorado has fifty corporate 
sponsors, including Coors Brewing Company which provides $300,000 
for scoreboard, radio, and television advertising as well as for displaying 
its logo on the mascot’s trailer.274  The basketball arena was named the 
Coors Event Center for a $5 million donation to the university.275  The 
University of Minnesota accepted $35 million to name its new football 
stadium, expected to open in 2009, the TCF Bank Stadium.276  As part of 
this sponsorship arrangement, TCF Bank acquired “access to [the] names 
and addresses of hundreds of thousands of alumni and season-ticket 
holders for marketing purposes.”277  Some universities even “endow” positions 
on the football team, as they do with some chaired faculty positions.  For 
example, a private donor has endowed the middle linebacker position on 
the Penn State University football team, and at least twenty other athletic 
positions, mostly on that team, are also endowed.278 
Like universities, bowl game entities also enjoy revenue from corporate 
sponsorships, earning most from “title sponsors” who pay for their corporate 
name to become part of the bowl game’s title.279  The FedEx Orange Bowl 
 
 271. See Terry Lefton, Big Wheel on Campus: NCAA Continues its Win Streak with 
$20M GM Pact, BRANDWEEK, Dec. 15, 1997, at 1. 
 272. Southeastern Conference, IRS Form 990, EIN 63-0377461, FYE Aug. 31, 2006 
(on file with author). 
 273. Big East Conference, IRS Form 990, EIN 51-0244593, FYE June, 30, 2006 
(on file with author). 
 274. See Eitzen, supra note 60. 
 275. Id.  That universities accept financing from beer producers and permit those 
products to be advertised on campus while simultaneously professing concern about alcohol 
abuse among their underage students illustrates the tremendous allure of corporate funding. 
 276. Bill Ordine, Field of Green: Maryland’s Sale of Naming Rights at Byrd 
Stadium is Part of Growing Practice as Athletic Programs Strive to Compete, BALT. 
SUN, Aug. 25, 2006, at 1F. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See Martin, supra note 179. 
 279. See Lee, supra note 268, at 22 (describing significant increase in sponsorship 
payment from MasterCard when it went from “presenting” to “title” sponsor of the 
Alamo Bowl); Quesada, supra note 268 (noting that a “title sponsorship is a bowl 
game’s most valuable commodity”).  Twenty-six out of the thirty-two bowl games 
played at the end of the 2006–2007 season had a title sponsor.  See Schrotenboer, supra 
note 114114.  That year, title sponsors paid as little as $400,000 to name a lower-tier 
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is one example.  Short of selling title sponsorships, some bowls earn 
revenue from “presenting sponsors.”  The “Rose Bowl Game, presented by 
Citi” illustrates this trend.280  At least one bowl, the Music City Bowl, 
has had both title and presenting sponsors simultaneously: “Gaylord 
Hotels Music City Bowl Presented By Bridgestone.”281  In addition to 
title and presenting sponsors, smaller sponsors provide money or in-kind 
goods and services for association with a particular bowl game.282 
Corporate sponsorship has been a natural outgrowth of the huge increase 
in the popularity of college sports.  Over the years, college football 
attendance has skyrocketed, demonstrating the heightened popularity 
and commercialism of the enterprise.  From 1965 to 1975, attendance 
rose 28.4%.  From 1975 to 1980, it increased from 31.7 million to 35.5 
million, a forty-four percent jump since 1965.283  College basketball, too, 
has enjoyed huge increases in popularity.  Since Magic Johnson of MSU 
and Larry Bird of Indiana State battled for the national championship 
title in 1979, interest in the NCAA basketball tournament has boomed 
with attendance nearly tripling to more than 720,000 fans.284  Simultaneously, 
television revenue has grown eightfold,285 and nearly 20 million U.S. 
households now watch the tournament’s biggest games.286  This popularity 
corresponds to a Nielsen rating of 18.9, even higher than that for the 
2003 National Championship Tostitos Fiesta Bowl football game of 17.2.287 
As the popularity of college athletic events has soared, corporations 
have vied to sponsor games and to purchase advertising time at ever-
increasing rates.  The great numbers of loyal spectators provide a perfect 
opportunity for corporations to advertise their commercial products, and 
their eagerness to pay premium amounts to do so demonstrates the 
effectiveness of this advertising venue.288  Referring to his company’s 
 
bowl game and as much as $10 million to name a BCS bowl game.  Id.  For a partial list 
of bowl games and their title sponsors, see supra note 136. 
 280. Quesada, supra note 268. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See Hamm, supra note 268; Quesada, supra note 268. 
 283. BYERS, supra note 16, at 149. 
 284. Martin, supra note 92. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id.  Nielsen Media Research estimated that 132.7 million viewers watched all 
or part of the 2007 NCAA Basketball Tournament on CBS and 40.3 million viewers 
tuned in for the final championship game.  See CBS Sports, Ratings for ’07 NCAA 
Men’s National Championship Game Up 9 Percent, http://www.sportsline.com/cbssports/ 
story/10106567 (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). 
 287. See BCS, TV Ratings, supra note 129. 
 288. While broadcasters pay enormous sums to the NCAA and conferences for the 
right to televise college basketball and football games, they earn even larger amounts by 
selling advertising time during those events.  The following chart shows the sums major 
college sports broadcasters paid in 2001–2002 for the right to broadcast football and 
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decision to pay the NCAA six billion dollars over eleven years for rights 
to broadcast the annual men’s basketball tournament and thereby generate 
even more in advertising revenue, CBS Vice President Michael Aresco 
said, “It’s one of the few platinum events out there, . . . It’s well worth it 
to us.”289 
Corporations are deeply involved in major college sports, investing in 
them through sponsorships and other means so as to advertise their 
products and enhance their corporate images.  In this way, too, college 
sports have abandoned any realistic claim to amateurism and have 
instead become thoroughly commercial. 
 
men’s basketball games, together with the advertising revenue those networks earned for 
ads aired during those games: 
 
 
COLLEGE BASKETBALL AND FOOTBALL: 2001–2002 
 




in Advertising (in 
millions) 
Profit (in millions) 
ABC $91 $145 $54 
ESPN $140 $115 ($25) 
NBC $12 $16 $4 
CBS $236 $340 $104 
Total $479 $616 $137 
 
Penelope Patsuris, A Wider World of TV Sports, FORBES.COM, Dec. 12, 2002, available 
at http://www.forbes.com/2002/12/12/cx_pp_1212sports.html (Tables—Sports Rights 
Versus Revenue, 2001–2002).  While broadcasters paid a total of $479 million in 2001–
2002 for the right to televise college football and men’s basketball games, they received 
$616 million from selling advertising time during those games, harvesting a combined 
$137 million profit for that year.  Id.; accord Lee, supra note 268, at 22 (describing 
marketing study findings that MasterCard would reap $2.7 million to $3.5 million in 
exposure value from being a presenting or a title sponsor, respectively, of the Alamo 
Bowl versus the $1 million to $1.5 million cost per year of doing so); Schrotenboer, 
supra note 114 (indicating title sponsors of the January 2006 BCS Bowl games paid 
approximately $10 million for that status, but received at least $106 million in value 
from the resulting visibility of logos during the games). 
 289. Martin, supra note 92 (quoting CBS vice president Aresco). 
A different example of the increasing commercialization of college sports lies in the 
cost of advertising college football games on television.  By the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the cost to advertise college football was nearing the expense of advertising NFL 
games.  See BYERS, supra note 16, at 146.  The more popular college games became, the 
more conferences became willing to pay broadcasters to advertise their games.  Over 
time, the advertising charge for college games approached that for professional games, 
and, once again, the line of demarcation between professional and amateur sports faded. 
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H.  Commercial Use of Athlete’s Image 
Another particularly pernicious way in which universities have grown 
crassly and indeed abusively commercial is in their taking of their 
athletes’ images for “commercial enhancement.”290  Universities have 
long profited from selling jerseys and other apparel bearing the number 
of a star athlete.291  More recently, they have begun earning fees from 
licensing star athletes’ images to video game manufacturers who use the 
players as characters in their products.292  The athlete himself, however, 
is forbidden any of those profits by NCAA rule which prohibits him 
from using his own image for profit by sponsoring or endorsing a product.293  
In precluding such action, the NCAA and its member institutions reserve 
for themselves all profits to be derived from the commercial use of the 
athlete’s image.294  This source of revenue is not incidental.295  Collegiate 
 
 290. BYERS, supra note 16, at 346. 
 291. See Marcia Chambers, Men’s Final 4; Sales of College Stars’ Jerseys Raise 
Ethics Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at D1. 
 292. See Matthew G. Matzkin, Gettin’ Played: How the Video Game Industry 
Violates College Athletes’ Rights of Publicity By Not Paying for Their Likenesses, 21 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 227, 239–44 (2001) (describing realistic features of computerized 
video games); Mueller, supra note 82, at 83 (describing NCAA practice of allowing 
video game creators to use schools’ fight songs and uniforms as well as jersey numbers, 
but not the names, of star athletes); Chambers, supra note 291.  Because individual 
athletes can be identified by number and image however, reviews of the video games 
refer to athletes by name.  See Matzkin, supra, at 240–41; Scott Rabalais, NCAA and 
ABC Gain Yardage with Computer College Football, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Jan. 16, 
1998, at Fun 32. 
 293. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, arts. 2.9, 12.5.2.1.  Specifically, an individual 
cannot be a college athlete if, once in school, he 
   [a]ccepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her name or 
picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a 
commercial product or service of any kind, or . . . [r]eceives remuneration for 
endorsing a commercial product or service through the individual’s use of such 
product or service. 
Id. art. 12.5.2.1(a), (b).  This rule prevented Shaun Jordan, a championship swimmer for 
the University of Texas, from engaging in a custom T-shirt business during his 
undergraduate career.  It was a violation for him to sell T-shirts emblazoned with the motto 
“Don’t Mess with Texas Swimming.”  BYERS, supra note 16, at 380; see Freedman, supra 
note 181, at 679; Robert Lipsyte, A Year at School: On Pay for Play, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2002, at H11; Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has Evolved Over Time, NCAA 
NEWS, Jan. 3, 2000, available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal (follow “Library” 
hyperlink; then “NCAA News Archive” hyperlink; then “2000” hyperlink; then 
“Association-wide” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). 
 294. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 12.5.1.1(h) (allowing NCAA member 
schools to sell for profit to support educational activities and activities related to 
intercollegiate athletics commercial items containing the names, likenesses, or pictures 
of multiple athletes from that university); id. at art. 12.5.1.1.1 (allowing the NCAA or its 
third party representative to use the name or picture of an enrolled student-athlete to 
promote NCAA championships and other NCAA events, activities, and programs); 
BYERS, supra note 16, at 371; Schott, supra note 57, at 46 (citing Kenneth L. Shropshire, 
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licensing has recently been estimated to generate $2.8 billion in retail 
sales annually.296 
In addition to apparel and other goods bearing the names of universities, 
video games featuring college football and basketball have become a 
significant source of revenue.  EA Sports, for example, expects to sell 
three million copies, at sixty dollars each, of its “NCAA Football 2008” 
video game, for estimated gross revenue from that product of $180 million.297  
Video game manufacturers, in turn, pay royalties to the NCAA, which 
distributes those funds to its member universities on the basis of a 
variety of factors including each university’s recent athletic success.298  
In 2006–2007, Arizona State University received $102,482 from royalties 
for video games.299  In 2005–2006, Ohio State University and Florida 
State University each received royalties of $130,500 due to sales by EA 
Sports of its “NCAA Football” video game.300 
The notorious case of Jeremy Bloom provides a stunning example of 
how the NCAA, but not the athlete, may profit from the athlete’s image.  
Bloom is a remarkable athlete, having excelled in both downhill skiing 
and football.  Not only was he a member of the 2002 U.S. Olympic 
Team, he also won the U.S. National and World Cup championships 
in freestyle skiing that same year.301  Bloom obtained numerous endorsement 
and sponsorship opportunities following his Olympic experience, including 
 
Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. 
SPORTS L. 7, 25 (1991)). 
 295. See Chambers, supra note 291 (reporting NCAA estimates from the early 
2000s that Division I universities selling T-shirts and other team apparel each generate 
approximately $6 million to $7 million a year and that approximately six percent of those 
revenues, or perhaps $360,000, is for the sale of replica jerseys). 
 296. Tom Sosnowski, On Campus; College a Big Sell in Licensing Biz, PLAYTHINGS, 
Oct. 1, 2005, at 28. 
 297. See Ryan Finley, They’re in the Game: Popular Sports Titles Put Fans under 
Center, Cash in School Coffers, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Aug. 12, 2007. 
 298. See Andy Latack, Quarterback Sneak: With Its College Football Video Game, 
EA Sports is Making an End Run Around the NCAA’s Rules, LEGAL AFF., Feb. 2006, at 
69; Rachel Bachman, A Piece of the Pixels, OREGONIAN, July 20, 2007, at E1; Andrew 
Carter, Colleges Profit from Video Game’s Success, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2006, 
at D1; Finley, supra note 297; John Maher, Video Game = $ for UT, AUSTIN AM. 
STATESMAN, July 18, 2006, at C1. 
 299. Finley, supra note 297. 
 300. Bachman, supra note 298. 
 301. See Freedman, supra note 181, at 674; Mueller, supra note 8282, at 74; Jeremy 
Bloom, Educating Jeremy, SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 30, 2004, at 52. 
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a valuable modeling contract with clothier Tommy Hilfiger.302  Proceeds 
from these arrangements were all used to fund his continuing ski training.303 
After his Olympic achievements, Bloom enrolled at the University of 
Colorado where his talents as a football player had earned him a scholarship 
to play football.304  Having capitalized on his handsome looks and on his 
fame as a U.S. Olympic downhill skier, Bloom was later held to have 
violated NCAA amateurism rules305 rendering him ineligible to play football 
for the Buffaloes.306  Astonishingly, the University of Colorado, an NCAA 
institution, was permitted under NCAA rules to profit off the licensing 
of the images of football players,307 but Jeremy Bloom could not similarly 
profit without foregoing his ability to participate in college football. 
Normally, an individual owns his own image and can enjoy profits 
therefrom if valuable.308  In the world of college sports, however, the 
 
 302. See Freedman, supra note 181, at 674; Mueller, supra note 82, at 74. 
 303. See Mueller, supra note 82, at 75; Bloom, supra note 301. 
 304. See Freedman, supra note 181, at 674. 
 305. The rule in question was NCAA Bylaw 12.5.2.1, which prohibited athletes 
from using their name or likeness to promote a commercial product.  See DIV. I MANUAL, 
supra note 13, art. 12.5.2.1.  The university requested, but the NCAA denied, a waiver of 
the bylaw.  See Adam Thompson, Bloom Sues NCAA; Skier Wants to Play for Buffs, 
DENV. POST, July 26, 2002, at D02.  Judge Hale of the Boulder County District Court 
rejected Bloom’s ensuing motion for injunctive relief and upheld the NCAA’s ruling.  
See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249, slip op. at 7 (20th Dist. 
Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002) (“Although the administrative process relating to this rule could 
have, and I think should have, allowed an accommodation to be reached as to Mr. 
Bloom’s interest and the interest of the NCAA, the failure to do so was not arbitrary and 
capricious.”); Freedman, supra note 181, at 683–84. 
 306. The issue was not whether Mr. Bloom’s modeling contract should make him 
ineligible for an athletic scholarship.  When informed his modeling contract had violated 
NCAA rules, he declined his football scholarship and requested the NCAA merely grant 
him permission to play intercollegiate football without a scholarship.  See Verified 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 17, Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249 (20th Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002); Thompson, supra note 
305.  NCAA rules, however, made Mr. Bloom ineligible even to participate in college 
football.  See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 12.5.2.1 (stating that the athlete “shall 
not be eligible for participation”).  The NCAA rules operated thusly even though Mr. 
Bloom’s modeling contract resulted from skiing fame arising prior to his involvement in 
college football. 
 307. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 12.5.1.1, 12.5.1.1(h) (permitting the 
athlete’s university to sell items containing multiple athletes’ names, pictures, or 
likenesses); cf. DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 12.5.1.1.1 (permitting NCAA and its 
agents to use the name or picture of an enrolled student-athlete to promote NCAA 
championships, events, activities, and other programs). 
 308. The right of publicity protects individuals, primarily celebrities, against the 
unauthorized commercial use of their names, likenesses, and personal identities.  See 
Mueller, supra note 82, at 70–73 (describing application of the right of publicity to 
athletes).  For a discussion of the right of publicity, see generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (2d ed. 2008); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of 
Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. 
REV. 1199 (1986); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 203 (1954). 
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member institutions of the NCAA take for themselves value from a 
group it claims are their students.309  As former NCAA Executive Director 
 
 309. “The encroachment of commercialization on educational values is particularly 
unfortunate because it depends, at bottom, on a willingness to take unfair advantage of 
students.”  Derek Bok, The Purely Pragmatic University: The Costs of Commercializing 
the Academy, HARV. MAG., May–June 2003, at 28, 30. 
Following Jeremy Bloom’s banishment from the University of Colorado football 
program, he authored an incisive editorial, providing in part: 
   Two years ago, I became a proud member of the 2002 Winter Olympics team 
and then won the World Cup overall title as a freestyle skier.  Then, a few 
weeks later, the NCAA informed me that if it were to allow me to continue my 
financial means of paying for my trainer, nutritionist, physical therapist and 
agent for skiing, I would be endangering the core principle of amateurism as a 
college football player.  Although at the time it seemed silly, looking back I 
believe they made the right call.  It is true my relationship with those people 
would have been more damaging to the spirit of amateurism than, say, the 
University of Miami’s relationship with star football recruit Willie Williams, 
who has been arrested 11 times since 1999. 
   So I took their advice and dropped all my legitimate ski-related sponsors and 
enrolled at the University of Colorado, where I became a proud member of the 
football program and the social science department. 
   . . . [T]he NCAA denied multiple waivers to let me play football. . . . 
   . . . . 
   . . . [T]he NCAA holds a tight monopoly on the “rental business.”  In fact, it 
rents out college athletes every year.  While I was in college, the NCAA rented 
me out to many different corporations and allowed me to play in endorsement-
filled stadiums every week.  The NCAA even allowed the university to sell a 
jersey with my school and my number on it in stores all over Colorado. 
   I didn’t get any of the money that was generated by this service, but at least 
the NCAA paid for my schooling, right?  Well, no.  Actually, the NCAA didn’t 
pay a penny of my scholarship, and the university only paid half.  The other 
half came from my “personal scholarship donor,” a private citizen who donates 
money to Colorado to fund student-athlete scholarships.  Now that the NCAA 
is finished with me, it simply will dismiss me, just like it does with thousands 
of student-athletes every year.  And why wouldn’t it, when it has thousands of 
fresh-faced, new student-athletes every year who are eager to join the cycle? 
   . . . Aaron Adair was a young man who battled brain cancer for a long 
portion of his life.  He not only had enough heart to become part of the select 
few in the country to overcome the unthinkable disease, but he also possessed 
enough to make the University of Oklahoma’s varsity baseball team. 
    Aaron wrote his own book while he was in college, intending to give other 
cancer patients hope they too could win their battles with the disease.  After his 
book was published, the compassionate and understanding folks at the NCAA 
ended Aaron’s dream of playing baseball because his name was attached to a 
“corporate product.” 
   . . . . 
   All of the lessons I learned from this organization will make me a rich man.  
Eventually, I think I’ll start my own amateur business.  I not only will provide 
housing and a positive working environment, I also will teach my employees 
the benefits of working as a team.  And though I’ll be making millions running 
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Walter Byers observed, NCAA rules prevent “direct dealings between 
the commercial, for-profit world and the athlete.  This is not about 
amateurism.  This has to do with who controls the negotiations and gets 
the money.”310  The regime by which NCAA universities, but not an 
athlete himself, may profit off the athlete’s likeness or number, itself an 
exquisite illustration of exploitation, unequivocally demonstrates that the 
relationship between universities and their athletes has become intensely 
commercial.  The NCAA’s activities in this area can hardly be said to 
further the tax-exempt, public purpose of education.  Instead, commercial 
motives dominate. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Fables endure because they reveal truth.  Among the most classic and 
lasting is Hans Christian Andersen’s “The Emperor’s New Clothes.”311  
There, an emperor cared more about his clothing than anything else.  
Two rogues devised a plan to set themselves up as weavers, claiming 
“they could weave beautiful and rare cloth,” but that if a fool or person 
unfit to do his work viewed it, “he would see nothing.”  Neither the emperor, 
nor his ministers, wishing to be either fool or unfit, would acknowledge 
seeing nothing, but instead proclaimed the beauty and wondrousness of 
the new garments.  It was not until the emperor paraded through the 
town in his new finery that a child was heard to say, “[H]e has nothing 
on!”  The child’s father said, “Listen to the innocent; he says the emperor 
has nothing on.”  Shortly, “the whole crowd shouted, ‘The emperor has 
nothing on!’”  And although the emperor heard them, “he only held his head 
higher and walked more stiffly than ever, and behind him the two 
chamberlains carried the invisible train.” 
There are truths we wish not to know, and therefore do not see.  
Having once viewed them, however, they can no longer be denied.  Like 
the emperor’s clothes, the notion that major college sports are amateur is 
also a fairy tale.  The truth is that they are profoundly and increasingly 
commercial and plainly not amateur at all.  If the law is to eschew a 
 
this business, I will sympathetically tell my employees that paying them would 
corrupt the purity of my business and their learning experience.  If they try to 
support themselves in other ways I find inappropriate, I’ll dismiss them. 
Bloom, supra note 301. 
 310. BYERS, supra note 16, at 346; see also id. at 376, 388; Mueller, supra note 82, 
at 80–84 (describing university commercial exploitation of athletes through trading 
cards, jerseys, and video games); Arthur Kempton, Native Sons, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 
11, 1991, at 55, 57–59 (describing system whereby athletic shoe manufacturers contract 
with college coaches, not the players themselves, for use and advertisement of their 
products). 
 311. Andersen, supra note 1, at 62–68. 
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“tyranny of labels,” then it must revisit the broad exemptions accorded 
major college sports from the laws we describe—labor law, antitrust, and 
tax—and from all laws exempting amateur enterprises from their reach. 
The NCAA is the nation’s college sports emperor.  It parades through 
the land wrapped in the veil of amateurism.  Until a child—“the 
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